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V 
Summary 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to advance the state of knowledge on two bodies of 
literature related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, namely track-II diplomacy and 
religion and peacebuilding.  Two primary research objectives are considered: first, to 
analyze the extent that current interreligious initiatives between Israelis and 
Palestinians can be characterized as track-II diplomacy; second, to identify what 
Palestinian and Israeli religious leaders view as key possibilities, as well as major 
obstacles, toward a viable interreligious track-II channel.   
 
Findings from in-depth interviews conducted with Muslim, Christian, and Jewish 
leaders in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories suggest that interreligious 
track-II efforts may be uniquely positioned to address many of the religiously sensitive 
issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, yet face many of the same limitations as 
traditional track-II models.  They struggle to make a vertical impact on the formal 
political channels, face the challenge of recruiting ideal participants, and take on 
several formal track-I-like characteristics that are contrary to track-II diplomacy.  
Ultimately, religious leaders may be better positioned to transfer mutually generated 
ideas horizontally rather than prompting a formal track-I peace agreement between 
parties. Nevertheless, Palestinian-Israeli interreligious track-II efforts can undoubtedly 
be recognized as an underutilized subset of track-II diplomacy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
VI 
Acronyms 
 
CRIHL Council of Religious Institutions of the Holy Land 
ICCI  Interreligious Coordinating Council in Israel 
MK  Member of the Israeli Knesset 
OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
PA  Palestinian National Authority 
 
 
Figures 
Figure 2.1: “Situating Track-II Diplomacy”……………………………….15 
Figure 3.1: “Interview Respondents”………………………………………24 
 
 
 
 
VII 
Foreword 
 
The term “stalemate” refers to the point when a conflict has reached an impasse, and 
resolution seems impossible (i.e. a no-win situation).  This thesis is dedicated to those 
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May they find the support, will, and courage to keep striving for a just peace and 
human rights for all. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
For over 60 years, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has eluded any viable peace 
settlement and has dominated the headlines.  Like other intractable conflicts1, official 
contact between the conflicting parties is often tense, or even non-existent, and the 
prospect of finding a solution that is perceived by all parties as less costly than 
continued fighting seems even more daunting over time. The need for alternative 
mechanisms to break stalemate, to address the needs of the parties, and to support a 
just peace remains a pressing concern. 
 
In recent decades, scholars and practitioners have increasingly viewed track-II 
diplomacy as one possible mechanism for conflict management and resolution between 
Israelis and Palestinians.2  Joseph Montville (1992, 255) defines track-II diplomacy as 
“unofficial, informal interaction among members of adversarial groups or nations with 
the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and organizing human 
and material resources in ways that might help to resolve the conflict.”  Proponents of 
track-II diplomacy argue that such unofficial dialogue outside of government-to-
government negotiations can address issues that would seem outside the range of more 
formal diplomatic channels as well as transfer new ideas to both the grassroots 
populations and formal political channels.  Thus, a significant amount of research has 
been conducted on track-II efforts3 between Israelis and Palestinians.4 
 
                                            
1 Crocker et al. (2005, 5) broadly define intractable conflicts as those conflicts which “have persisted over time 
and refuse to yield to efforts – through either direct negotiations by the parties or mediation with third-party 
assistance – to arrive at political settlement.” 
2 This thesis thematically corresponds with a paper written for PECOS 4100 in autumn 2010 on track-II 
diplomacy, yet consists of its own independent research and conclusions. 
3 This thesis uses the terms “track-II diplomacy,” “track-II efforts,” and “track-II initiatives” interchangeably. 
4 See Funk (2000), Kaye (2001), and Cuhadar (2009). 
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While the field is certainly not lacking in diversity, one particular theme and set of 
participants that have been thoroughly understudied relates to the role of religion in 
the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.  Whereas most scholars and analysts 
would reject the notion that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is religious in nature, it 
would be an oversimplification to assume the conflict is entirely secular.5  Religious 
symbols, language, rituals, and identities affect the perceptions and behavior of even 
those Israelis and Palestinians who do not characterize themselves as religious.  The 
conflict is saturated with examples of religious beliefs and rituals being used to justify 
violence and forceful policies, and it is increasingly being framed as a zero-sum, 
religious war.  As Cohen (2005, 347) points out: “The conflict’s intractability is 
exacerbated by the subtext of religion-based historical perceptions, theological or 
quasi-theological judgment, and aspersions and popular myths cast about the 
relationship among Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.”  Thus, the lack of research 
explicitly conducted on the possibility for an interreligious track-II diplomatic effort 
represents a major gap in both literature on track-II diplomacy, and literature related to 
religion and peacebuilding.6 
  
1.2 Focus of the Present Research and Research Objectives 
 
Based on the assumption that track-II diplomacy indeed has the potential to ease 
tensions between parties and pave the way for political solutions, this research aims to 
advance the state of knowledge on two bodies of literature related to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  Primarily, this study addresses the gap found in literature on 
track-II diplomacy by exploring the possibilities and limitations of religious actors 
serving in track-II roles in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories.7  At the same 
time, this research also aims to supplement current literature on religion and 
                                            
5 Rabbi Marc Gopin (2002, 108) writes: “There is no such thing as a protracted and intractable conflict that is 
exclusively religious, and it is quite possible that there is no such thing as a nonreligious conflict.” 
6 This thesis employs the broad term “peacebuilding” to describe activities that go beyond crisis intervention and 
emphasize the establishment of a durable, sustainable peace. 
7 “The occupied Palestinian territories” is the official term used by the United Nations to describe the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip.  See OCHA (2010). 
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peacebuilding by investigating the practical linkage between interreligious initiatives 
and track-II diplomacy between Israelis and Palestinians. Thus, this study has two 
central research objectives:   
 
1.) to analyze the extent that current interreligious initiatives between Israelis and 
Palestinians can be characterized as track-II diplomacy.  
 
2.) to identify what Israeli and Palestinian religious leaders view as key 
possibilities, as well as major obstacles, toward a viable interreligious track-II 
channel.  
 
The rationale for this research is two-fold.  First, the success of previous track-II 
efforts between Israelis and Palestinians demands greater attention to the field.  Efforts 
throughout the 1970s and 80s provided support for political leaders to make difficult 
decisions, while many scholars still refer to the Oslo talks of the early 1990s as the 
“mother of all track-II talks” due to their role in laying the framework for the later 
Oslo Accords.8  Since all concentrated track-II efforts solely included a limited pool of 
scholars, senior journalists, former government and/or former military officers, track-II 
diplomacy scholars must examine the implications and possibilities for new channels 
of communication; including the prospects for interreligious track-II efforts. As Jafari 
(2007, 126) argues, “recognition of religious peacemakers as a subset of the track II-
community and as an underutilized resource” is a necessary, but currently lacking, 
component of the discourse.   
 
Second, while the literature on religion and peacebuilding often briefly cites 
interreligious dialogue as a form of “track-II diplomacy,” minimal literature has been 
devoted to the actual analysis of this characterization.  A more comprehensive analysis 
                                            
8 For in-depth case studies on a number of track-II efforts that have occurred between Israelis and Palestinians, 
see Agha et al.’s (2003) volume “Track II Diplomacy: Lessons from the Middle East.” 
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of what can be characterized as track-II diplomacy, and what might be other models of 
peacebuilding, is required.   
 
1.3 Overview of Methodology  
 
Over the period of January 18th to March 1st, 2011, thirteen in-depth, qualitative 
interviews were conducted with religious leaders in Israel and the occupied Palestinian 
territories (four Muslims, six Jews, and three Christians), all of whom have had 
extensive experience in interreligious efforts between parties. By adopting a 
qualitative, inductive approach, I sought to discover “the meaning that participants 
attach to their behavior, how they interpret situations, and what their perspectives are 
on particular issues” (Woods 2006, 3).  Emphasis was placed on identifying the main 
possibilities and limitations of what I define as interreligious track-II diplomacy 
between Israelis and Palestinians, specifically through the eyes of those participating 
in it. 
 
This thesis adopts an interpretist epistemology, meaning that this study attempts to 
understand phenomena through analyzing meanings that religious leaders in Israel and 
the occupied Palestinian territories assign to these phenomena (Bryman 2008, 16).  In 
order to do this, I utilize a research design that can best be described as a cross-
sectional survey with case study elements.  Cross-sectional research is used to take a 
snapshot of the attitudes of a subset of a particular population at a certain moment in 
time rather than tracking changes in attitudes. The unique context of religious leaders 
in the Israeli-Palestinian context, however, requires greater attention to the specific 
attributes of the leaders and their surroundings than a cross-sectional approach alone 
allows. This study therefore utilizes several case-study strategies to “richly describe, 
explain, or assess and evaluate a phenomenon [e.g., event, person, program, etc.]” 
(Gall et al. 1996, 549).  
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1.4 Outline of Thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into six chapters.  Chapter 2 places this study within the larger 
analytical and theoretical framework related to track-II diplomacy, identifying the key 
assumptions and aims of track-II efforts.  Additionally, it provides a review of the 
literature on track-II diplomacy between Israelis and Palestinians and offers a 
discussion on theoretical and practical possibilities for religious actors serving in 
track-II roles.   
 
Chapter 3 outlines the qualitative, cross-sectional/case study-based methodology 
employed by this research.  It also provides greater detail on the epistemological 
assumptions and aims of the study. 
 
Chapter 4 provides background context of the role of religion in Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, offering insight from not only scholarly research, but also perceptions of local 
religious leaders themselves.  It then begins the analysis of the extent to which current 
interreligious efforts can be characterized as track-II by developing a theoretical, 
definition that can be used to distinguish interreligious track-II initiatives from other 
interreligious efforts.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of the aims of 
interreligious track-II initiatives (as articulated by respondents to this study) in order to 
assess if their aims are consistent with other track-II efforts. 
 
Chapter 5 serves as the central chapter for identifying key obstacles and the 
possibilities of an interreligious track-II channel by analyzing the interviews conducted 
with key religious leadership.   
 
Finally, Chapter 6 provides final conclusions and recommendations for scholars and 
practitioners who may consider an interreligious track-II model. 
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2. Analytical Framework & Literature 
Review 
 
This chapter highlights three important concepts related to this thesis:  track-I 
diplomacy, track-II diplomacy, and faith-based diplomacy.  Additionally, this chapter 
demonstrates that while previous literature has comprehensively explored both the 
position of track-II diplomacy in conflict resolution and the role religious actors play 
in peacebuilding, a serious gap still remains in the linkage between the two bodies of 
literature.  
 
2.1 Traditional Track-I Diplomacy and its Limitations 
 
With few exceptions, the current conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is time and 
again described as a classic example of an intractable conflict.  Intractable conflicts 
are those that are deadlocked, intense, defiant, and extremely difficult to resolve 
(Coleman 2000). The United States Institute of Peace more specifically defines 
intractable conflicts as those “that have persisted over time and refused to yield to 
efforts – through either direct negotiations by the parties or mediation with third-party 
assistance – to arrive at a political settlement” (Crocker et al. 2005, 5).  While such 
resistance to negotiations may appear to derive from a single cause, closer examination 
usually points to multiple causes and contributing forces.9  
 
Authority to solve international disputes has traditionally been granted to the long-
established, power-political “Hobbesian” approaches to international relations in 
                                            
9 Zartman (2005) argues that five internal, process-generated characteristics combine to reinforce a conflict’s 
intractability: protracted time, identity denigration, conflict profitability, absence of ripeness, and solution 
polarization. These internal characteristics should not be understood as causal elements for the initiation of the 
conflict, but instead can be understood as process generated features that reinforce a conflict’s intractability.  He 
writes:  “While the characteristics are independent of each other, they also tend to reinforce on another, which in 
itself is an additional characteristic of intractability, making it hard to pry them apart and deal with them one by 
one” (2005, 55). 
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which state institutions are given the autonomous validity to make decisions on behalf 
of the people (Funk 2000).  Communication and decision making is done solely by 
representatives of the state (or state-like structures), and is conducted with other state 
(or state-like) representatives.  This technique, frequently characterized as track-I 
diplomacy, is  “a process whereby communications from one government go directly 
to the decision-making apparatus of another” (Said et al. 1995, 69). More concretely 
defined by Nan (2003, 1), track-I diplomacy are activities that:  
 
…involve direct government-to-government interaction on the official level.  Typical 
track-I activities include traditional diplomacy, official negotiations, and the use of 
international organizations.  The participants stand as representatives of their 
representative states and reflect the official positions of their governments during 
discussions. 
 
While track-I diplomacy serves a necessary component of instigating the structural 
change most often required for sustained peace, critics point to a number of limitations 
that inhibit track-I diplomacy from bringing forth new ideas and addressing every 
layer of an intractable conflict. Scholars and practitioners have therefore articulated a 
need for alternative mechanisms beyond track-I diplomacy to manage international 
disputes. 
 
2.1.1 Lack of Attention to the Conflict’s Roots 
 
Most frequently, critics of track-I diplomacy point out that the process often fails to 
fully address the importance of intangible human needs of the parties.  This argument 
is frequently noted by proponents of the so-called “human relations paradigm.” Based 
on the theoretical and applied work of Duetch (1973), Azar (1983), Kelman (1997), 
and Fisher (1997), the human relations paradigm stresses the vital role that social 
interactions have in triggering, perpetuating, and resolving conflicts.  Fear, distrust, 
misunderstanding, and hostile interactions within these social interactions (or lack of 
them) serve as a primary obstacle to constructive engagement.  Dysfunctional 
cognitive and behavioral patterns cannot be easily remedied by ordinary methods of 
diplomacy, or the use of force, for this reason.  
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Azar (2003) argues that intractable conflicts are specifically rooted in the ongoing 
denial, suppression, or compromise of fundamental human needs by others.  
According to Azar, individuals strive to satisfy a set of enduring human needs that 
allow for them to grow and develop in any culture or setting. While such needs 
generally include concrete items like food, clothing, energy, water, safety, and 
productive capability (2003, 21), they can also be as indistinct as the fundamental need 
for the acceptance of a communal identity of a group.  Azar (1990, 9) writes: “The 
formation and acceptance of identity thus also may be understood as a basic 
developmental need, with collective identity manifest in terms of cultural values, 
images, customs, language, religion, and racial heritage.”  Individuals or groups will 
pursue such nonnegotiable needs, both tangible and intangible, no matter the cost.  
Therefore, traditional diplomacy may be able to address the resource-based aspects of 
the conflict, but fails to provide a complete resolution if it overlooks the intangible 
needs of each party.  Azar bluntly concludes that “it is naïve to assume that protracted 
social conflicts can be managed by military or balance of power means alone” (1990, 
2). 
 
In her comparative study of intractable conflicts, Diana Chigas echoes the claim that 
track-I efforts have tended to overlook the human needs of parties. Chigas (2005, 126) 
writes: 
 
Intractable conflicts tend to involve basic human needs and values that the parties 
experience as critical to their survival and, as a consequence, as non-negotiable. 
Traditional instruments of negotiation, mediation, and conflict management are not 
adequate to address these aspects of the conflict.  They tend to be well suited to 
resolving resource-based issues…that may indeed serve as instrumental modalities for 
the protection of identity and human needs.  But issues of identity, survival, and 
demonization of the other requires a process that works directly to change the 
underlying human relationship and deals with perceptions, trust, and fears that fuel 
institutionalization and self-reinforcing dynamic that sustains intractability.  
 
Track-I diplomacy, in other words, may exhibit a number of limitations (partially 
explained by its structural constraints) that restrict its ability to address a party’s every 
need.  This point will be elaborated in more detail in the next section. 
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2.1.2 Structural Constraints of Track-I Diplomacy 
 
Beyond the argument that track-I diplomacy can only address the resource-based 
aspects of the conflict, critics have also argued that the traditional government-to- 
government model is rigid, formal, and overly constrained due to a number of 
structural limitations (Hopmann 1996, 184).  Former U.S. Secretary of State Harold 
Saunders points out three structural limitations in particular.  First, a government 
official is generally unable to speak separately from their government.  Regardless of 
how explicit government leaders may be about “speaking personally,” rival 
governments will likely perceive their words and actions as that of the official 
government position (Saunders 1991, 52).  To a large extent, the words of government 
officials will commit their governments in one way or another.  Thus, government 
officials will rarely stray far from the government’s official position.  While they may 
be willing to explore new ways of addressing the conflict, it is very unlikely that they 
will speak contrary to their own government.  Diplomats operate from a sense of 
loyalty and recognition of the need for discipline if the governmental system is to 
operate effectively.  For this reason, rival governments will find it difficult to believe 
that an official would be speaking without the permission of their government or that 
the government unquestioningly would support the leader’s “personal” ideas. 
 
A second related structural limitation is that government officials speak on behalf of 
the institution they represent, losing a very important human dimension of the 
relationship (Saunders 1991, 52-53).  Even if they disagree with the position, or had no 
part in setting the position, individuals who hold a title in the government are often 
restricted to present only the formal position adopted by the government.  They speak 
as if they were the institution itself rather than the people it represents.  Formal 
negotiations consist of the exchange of such positions, and the human elements of the 
conflict tend to be left untouched.   
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Finally, Saunders writes that the third structural challenge of traditional track-I 
diplomacy is that governments are often unable to quickly change existing ways of 
thinking to respond to new situations (Saunders 1991, 54). Governments have invested 
time, money, resources, and lives into traditional diplomatic channels and the positions 
that they bring forward.  They have analyzed the problem intensely and have made and 
reviewed every decision so far.  Due to these constraints, Saunders argues that track-I 
diplomats are often unable to easily adapt to new ways of thinking.  
 
2.2 The Evolution of Track-II Diplomacy 
 
Given both the structural challenges for track-I actors to bring forth new ideas, as well 
as the tendency of traditional diplomatic models to overlook the non-material needs of 
each party, scholars argue that other mechanisms for bringing resolution to the conflict 
are needed.  As Ambassador John W. McDonald (1999, 4), a former American 
diplomat, notes: 
 
Normal state-to-state or government-to-government diplomacy has shown itself, over 
the years, to be incapable of resolving the vast majority of conflicts in today’s world.  
The resolutions that are “settled” are usually based on the relative power of the parties 
concerned and can be unsettled if power shifts.  Currently, little effort is being made to 
reduce conflict by attacking the basic reasons for the conflict in the first place. 
 
Beginning during World War II, and then gaining momentum during the Cold War, 
the notion of a non-official diplomatic channel to fill in these gaps seemed to possess a 
particular appeal.  Scholars began to experiment with problem-solving workshops, 
third party consultation exercises, and similar modalities as a means of bringing people 
together on an unofficial level.  According to Funk (2000), terms such as unofficial 
diplomacy (Berman and Johnson 1977), public diplomacy (Hansen 1989), non-official 
mediation (Curle 1986), and analytical problem solving (Kelman 1997) were 
increasingly discussed, studied, and practiced as a possible second track of diplomacy 
as early as the 1960s. 
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The term track-II diplomacy was eventually coined by William D. Davidson and 
Joseph V. Montville in 1981 to describe all models of unofficial initiatives that aimed 
to support the resolution of a conflict situation (1981, 155). The term was originally 
used to illustrate the necessity of a second track to the formal negotiation channels 
between governments, and was re-defined by Montville (1992, 255) to specifically 
refer to: 
  
…unofficial, informal interaction among members of adversarial groups or nations 
with the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and organizing 
human and material resources in ways that might help to resolve the conflict. 
 
The more concrete definition sought to differentiate initiatives that intentionally 
addressed the political elements of the conflict from those that simply were 
interactions or dialogues between adversarial groups. Montville’s terminology helped 
consolidate the wide range of exchanges between opposing groups that supplement, 
rather than replace, traditional (track-I) diplomacy. Track-II diplomacy would provide 
an informal, flexible, and unofficial venue outside of official negotiation circles to fill 
in the holes that track-I diplomacy could not address.   
 
2.2.1 Assumptions of Track-II Diplomacy 
 
While scholars have been unable to reach consensus on the actual format and design of 
track-II diplomatic efforts,10 such efforts share certain basic underlying assumptions. 
First, track-II efforts are based on the fundamental belief that interactions between the 
adversarial groups in an unofficial setting will help improve relations between the two 
parties. Particularly in cases of intractability, violence and heightened tension usually 
lead to a complete interruption of formal lines of communication.  Restrictions in 
                                            
10 According to Jones (2008a), a significant debate actually exists amongst scholars whether a “generic” model 
of track-II diplomacy should be established at all.  Burton and Sandhole (1986) argue that a generic model of 
track-II diplomacy should be developed to allow for learning and practical purposes in various conflict settings, 
while Avurch and Black (1987) argue that nuances between specific cases makes a standard model of track-II 
diplomacy questionable.   
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communication could be a result of physical divide, but could also be political, social, 
and psychological constraints.  A lack of communication between the two parties 
serves as a contributing factor to the dehumanization of the other. Informal meetings, 
theoretically, can assist in the breaking down of negative stereotypes and 
generalizations of the other side.  As Chigas (2005, 140-141) argues: 
 
Unofficial intermediation processes engage the psychological dimensions of the 
definition of the conflict directly.  Participants identify underlying needs, values, and 
interests that are compatible and that can form the basis for a new definition of a 
common problem that the two dies share an interest in problem solving, and develop, 
as a result of deeper understanding of the other side’s needs, a greater openness to 
abandoning previous nonnegotiable positions. 
 
If such needs are identified, good will and reasonableness between the parties can be 
revealed and, according to Montville (1987, 162), actual or potential conflict can be 
resolved “by appealing to common human capabilities.”  
 
The second assumption, articulated by Cuhadar (2009, 641), is that “the improved 
relations and jointly formulated ideas are transferred and incorporated into the society 
and/or the official policymaking processes, thus, having an impact at a larger scale.” In 
other words, the initiative’s ultimate goal is not to exclusively address the one-on-one 
relationship between participants of the track-II meeting, but to have implications for 
the larger dynamics of the conflict.11 This can be accomplished in several ways.  Ball 
et al. (2006, 179), for example, argue that track-II diplomacy can best serve as a 
mechanism for the development of policy advice to governments: “New concepts or 
specified proposals can be debated in an atmosphere within which governments are not 
committed...In a sense, track-II, if accepted by regional governments, can serve as a 
kind of reserve of intellectual capacity.”  Gawerk (2006, 44) also highlights the link to 
the government institutions, writing that track-II diplomacy can lead to “ideas and 
                                            
11 A key distinction between track-II diplomacy and other forms of peacebuilding is its intention to link to 
traditional track-I processes.  Saunders (1991, 50), for example, argues that if the objective of participants is 
solely to “get to know the other side” through cultural exchanges, this should be distinguished as “people-to-
people” diplomacy rather than track-II diplomacy.  Such activities aim to develop personal experiences with 
one’s adversaries rather than to intentionally discuss issues facing each party. 
 
 
 
 
13 
insights that can be incorporated into the official governmental process and it provides 
space for discussions on how to viably improve the communication between the 
governments and/or parties.”  Other scholars point to the instrumental use of track-II 
diplomacy in affecting wider public opinion on peace processes.  Montville (1987, 
162), for example, argues that track-II diplomacy “seeks to promote an environment in 
a political community, through the education of public opinion, that would make it 
safer for political leaders to take risks for peace.”  Kelman (2002) notes that track-II 
diplomacy can encourage the momentum for peace by building broad public support, 
strengthening the political will for peacebuilding processes.   
 
In order to address the range of opinions for how track-II diplomacy specifically is 
transferred to larger peace processes, Agha et al. (2003) classify efforts into two broad 
descriptive categories:  “soft” and “hard” track-II diplomacy.  At a minimum, track-II 
diplomacy aims to improve each side’s understanding of the other’s positions and 
policies through an exchange of views, perceptions, and information.  In this scenario, 
talks aim to help participants familiarize themselves with one another, as well as the 
intangible identity-based dimensions of the struggle, in the hope of affecting larger 
public opinion.  Such activities can be considered “soft” track-II diplomacy. “Hard” 
track-II diplomacy, on the other hand, refers to talks that help negotiate political 
agreements between governments.  Participants talk about sensitive issues that cannot 
be dealt with in a formal setting between parties.  Agha et al. (2003, 3) write that the 
objective of such “hard” track-II talks is to reach a political agreement or 
understanding that will be acceptable to the conflicting parties.  These talks tend to 
take place in complete secrecy with as few people knowing about their activities as 
possible.  While “hard” track-I talks aim to intentionally address specific political 
elements of the conflict, Kaye (2007, 7) points out that “even ‘soft’ track two 
exchanges are policy-related and ultimately aim to address and solve” key challenges 
between the parties. 
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2.2.2 Participants of Track-II Diplomacy 
 
Given the assumption that track-II diplomacy is “to produce changes in the individual 
participants and to transfer these changes into the political process,” (Kelman 2002, 
47) participants involved usually have certain characteristics.  Most importantly, track-
II participants are non-officials who do not serve a role in the government’s formal 
diplomatic structures.12 They are often middle-level, civil society leaders with some 
form of access to decision-makers.13  Davies and Kaufman (2002) argue that such 
participants tend to have political influence on both the horizontal and vertical 
relationships of the conflict.  New insights from the processes are communicated 
vertically to the top levels, while simultaneously horizontally communicated to other 
civil society members “to consider how they might help each other in moving toward 
settlement or resolution of the conflict” (2002, 6). Participants bridge “critical divides 
that complicate and often retard the process of conflict transformation ... [including] 
the divisions between government and civil society, between elite and grassroots levels 
within communities, and between different cultural worldviews and assumptions about 
how to manage conflict and change” (2002, 3-4).  
 
Traditionally, track-II diplomatic efforts have included scholars, senior journalists, 
retired military or government officials, opinion leaders, or other politically influential 
individuals from conflicting parties. Agha et al. (2003) argue that regardless of their 
background, participants need to have certain characteristics and qualities.  First, they 
need to be available and committed to the process.  Track-II engagement “requires a 
considerable amount of time and effort,” (2003, 176) and a lack of it can compromise 
the exercise.  Second, they must be willing to take risks or think beyond the 
                                            
12 Scholars such as Nan (1999) and Böhmelt (2010) have developed a concept known as “Track One-and-a-Half” 
to refer to unofficial dialogues in which all or most of the participants from the conflicting sides are officials or 
non-officials acting on behalf of their respective governments.  They are usually very close to official processes, 
and such activities are usually held in strict secrecy.  Such processes have also been called “secret diplomacy”.   
13 Demant (1996) offers the distinction between track-II diplomacy and what he refers to as “citizens 
diplomacy.” Average civilians who are not in a position to affect the greater masses or public policy makers 
instead participate in “citizens’ diplomacy,” a process with its own merits and goals.   
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government position.  They write:  “Track-II talks require challenging or bypassing 
official positions or articulating creative ideas that do not correspond with the 
established “common wisdom within each camp. Track-II participants must be willing 
to ‘enlarge the envelope’” (2003, 176). Third, they need to come with some sort of 
generalizable expertise in their field.  Agha et al. note that specific technical expertise 
may slow down the process with too much detail, but participants need to be able to 
speak with some authority in their field.  Finally, they need to be prepared to use a 
problem-solving approach to their discussions.  A problem solving approach “implies 
a non-ideological perspective and a readiness to acknowledge that practical solutions 
on the ground are not always fully compatible with longstanding ideological or 
political aspirations” (2003, 177). Participants must therefore “‘step back’ from 
official positions to jointly explore the underlying causes of the dispute in the hope of 
jointly developing alternative ideas” (Jones 2008a, 4). 
!
Level 1: Official Channels 
-“Track-I Diplomacy” 
- Formal Peace Process 
- Government to Government 
- Politicians/Policy Makers/Diplomats!
Level 2: Unofficial Channels 
-“Track-II Diplomacy” 
- Elite actors 
- Academics/Former Military Officials/ 
Former Politicians/Religious Leaders 
 
Level 3: Grassroots 
-"Citizens Diplomacy" 
- Local Actors 
- Laypersons 
- See Demant (1996) 
Level 1 !: Semi-Official Channels 
-"Track 1 ! Diplomacy" 
- Government Representatives 
- Outside of Formal Peace Process 
- See Nan (1999) / Böhmelt (2010) 
Level 2 !: Unofficial/Grassroots 
-"People-To-People Diplomacy" 
- Cultural/Spiritual Exchanges 
- Elite and/or Grassroots Actors 
- See Saunders (1991) 
Figure 2.1: Situating Track-II Diplomacy 
Source: developed from Villumstad (2002, 19) 
!!
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2.3 Religious Actors and Track-II Diplomacy 
 
While literature on track-II diplomacy tends to overlook the prospects of religious 
actors serving in track-II roles, a significant amount of research has been conducted on 
religious actors in other peacebuilding roles.  Especially with the decline of the Cold 
War and the collapse of the former Soviet Union, scholars around the world have 
increasingly devoted academic attention to the question of religion, conflict, and peace 
(Little 2006, 95). Beginning in the 1990s, a sharp rise in the amount of literature on the 
practice of religious peace building indicated greater interest in the potential impact of 
religion as a constructive force rather than solely a source of violence and war.14 
Sampson (1997) notes that religious actors have played active and effective roles as 
advocates, intermediaries, observers, and pursuers of transnational justice. Little and 
Appleby (2004, 3) echo this claim, noting that in many situations, religious leaders 
have been asked to “mediate conflicts, reconcile opponents, and assume a larger share 
of the responsibility for social welfare and the common good.  Religious actors, after 
all, are long-term players who live among and often belong to the people and groups 
involved in conflict.”   
 
Throughout the literature, scholars have thus highlighted the distinct characteristics 
that religion and religious actors have that could contribute to peacebuilding. Religious 
leaders, in particular, may potentially be in a significant functional position for track-II 
diplomacy for several reasons.  First, religious leadership is generally able to access 
both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of society. As Villumstad (2002, 19) 
writes:  
 
Religious leaders have direct access both to the grassroots level and to the top 
leadership level. Their access to the grassroots is through their own religious 
communities, or ‘constituencies’. Their access to the top leadership is through their 
representative mandate from smaller or larger constituencies within the larger 
community. Their strategic potential to make a difference in conflicts is considerable, 
and transcends different levels in national and international contexts.  
                                            
14See Johnston and Sampson (1994) and Appleby (1996) for further discussion. 
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Second, religious leadership often represents the voice of collective identities in a 
conflict.  Moix (2006), for example, argues that religion is a significant factor in what 
contributes to a sense of self and place in society.  Since religion provides answers to 
most fundamental questions in life for many people, it often overcomes other identity 
factors in decision making.  Thus, religious identity can either draw on extreme lines 
between in- and out-groups (sacred and profane, human and divine, saved and 
unsaved, good and evil, etc.), or it can “provide an access point for connection with 
parties in conflict to build trust and open dialogue” (2006, 594). Hence, religious 
leaders are “in a position to negotiate with reference to the normative system of the 
religious group, and may at the same time be in a position to issue altered theological 
interpretations of the normative system” (Harpviken and Røislien 2005, 22). Religious 
leaders speak on behalf of the larger, non-tangible identity-based needs of the parties 
and are in a particular position to address the collective identity issues “manifest in 
terms of cultural values, images, customs, language, religion, and racial heritage” 
(Azar 1990, 9). 
 
Finally, religious leaders are able to bridge what Little and Appleby (2004, 11) refer to 
as the most relevant obstacle to many peace processes, namely the “hermeneutical 
gap.”  In other words, religious leaders are often in a position to connect the larger 
normative worldviews of the religious group with what is actually happening on the 
ground.  Religious narratives often tell the history of the region, the land and its 
peoples, and frame where one fits in the world in relation to other groups. Religious 
leaders exhibit an intimate knowledge of language of this religious framing, and have 
access to the long-term vision of peace for the conflicted society from a theological 
perspective.  As Little and Appleby (2004, 11) write, religious leaders can provide an 
important interpretive framework for negotiations as they are “at ease with many 
actors and familiar with the language and issues at stake.”  
 
Two areas of literature exhibit parallels to religious actors in track-II roles, but do not 
specifically entail track-II efforts: multi-track diplomacy and faith-based diplomacy. 
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First, given the theoretical and  applied merits of track-II diplomacy, Diamond and 
McDonald (1996) develop the concept further by breaking down diplomacy into nine 
discrete “tracks” known as “multi-track diplomacy.”15 Track VII relates specifically to 
“Religion or Peacemaking through Faith in Action,” and it examines the beliefs and 
peace-oriented actions of spiritual and religious communities.  McDonald (1999, 22) 
argues that the use of a multi-track system more effectively identifies nonnegotiable 
issues, and removes a traditional “hierarchy” of diplomatic models in favor of inter-
dependant tracks that address different elements of the conflict.  The difference 
between track-II diplomacy with religious actors and the religious track of multi-track 
diplomacy, however, is that Diamond and McDonald’s definition includes all activities 
related to addressing spiritual dimensions of the conflict.  This does not necessarily 
include activities that are explicitly track-II. 
 
Second, the broad term faith-based diplomacy was popularized by Douglas Johnston to 
describe unofficial activities “that integrate the dynamics of religious faith with the 
conduct of international peacemaking” (2003, 15).  Cox et al. (2003, 31) expand this 
further to refer to faith-based diplomacy as: 
 
Peacebuilding efforts rooted in religions—their texts, their practices, their 
traditions...Practitioners of faith-based diplomacy will, to be sure, draw upon secular 
expertise in conflict resolution and analysis, political science and philosophy, 
experience in national security, diplomacy, community development, and the like. But 
their central, orienting compass is their faith. 
 
The aim of such broad incorporation of religion into international affairs is that 
religion can be made part of the solution to some of the intractable, identity-based 
conflicts rather than a destructive force.  While Johnston refers to faith-based 
diplomacy as a form of track-II diplomacy, (2003, 31) his and Cox et al.’s definitions 
entail a wider incorporation of faith-based actors into peacebuilding rather than 
                                            
15 The nine tracks are as follows:  Track I – formal government-to-government negotiations; track II – 
Nongovernmental/Professional; track III – Business; track IV – Private citizens; track V – Research, training and 
education; track VI - Activism; track VII – Religion; track VII – Funding; track IX – Communications and 
Media 
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specifically track-II diplomacy.  For this reason, research on interreligious track-II 
diplomacy could certainly be characterized as research carried out on one model of 
faith-based diplomacy. 
 
Finally, while literature on traditional diplomatic channels and track-II diplomacy have 
tended to overlook the use of religious actors in favor of more traditional participants, 
some scholars of religion and peacebuilding have characterized interreligious 
initiatives as a type of track-II diplomacy.16 The problem with this characterization is 
not that it is incorrect – the problem is that the characterization rarely expands beyond 
an acknowledgment that faith-based peacebuilding occurs at an unofficial level with 
non-governmental actors.17 As demonstrated earlier, track-II diplomacy does not 
include every non-official meeting between non-governmental actors in a conflict. 
Greater attention and analysis is needed on the question of religious actors in explicit 
track-II roles. 
 
 
                                            
16 See Abu-Nimer et al. (2007); Bagir (2007); Little (2006); Weinberger (2004) 
17 Both Abu-Nimer (2004) and Harpviken and Røislin (2005, 16-17) are exceptions to this, spending some time 
expanding on characterization of interreligious work as track-II diplomacy.  
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3. Research Design and Methodology 
 
In this chapter, I will discuss the research design and methodology used to address this 
study’s research objectives, particularly highlighting the specifics of fieldwork carried 
out in early 2011. This thesis generally follows research methods employed by the 
social sciences, but is inspired by additional fields such as interreligious studies.18 
 
3.1 Research Design and Strategy 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, this research aims to advance the state of knowledge on two 
bodies of literature related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (namely track-II 
diplomacy and the role of religion in peacebuilding) by addressing the aforementioned 
research objectives: 
 
1.) to analyze the extent that current interreligious initiatives between Israelis and 
Palestinians can be characterized as track-II diplomacy. 
 
2.) to identify what Israeli and Palestinian religious leaders view as key 
possibilities, as well as major obstacles, toward a viable interreligious track-II 
channel. 
 
This research thus can be described as exploratory, or research that aims to investigate 
a specified problem for the purpose of shedding new light upon it and uncovering new 
knowledge.  Schutt (2006, 14) writes that exploratory research “seeks to find out how 
people get along in the setting under question, what meanings they give to their 
actions, and what issues concern them. The goal is to learn 'what is going on here?' and 
to investigate social phenomena without explicit expectations.”  While the first 
                                            
18 For further information on how the Faculty of Theology/University of Oslo approaches the academic 
discipline of Interreligious Studies, see http://www.tf.uio.no/forskning/omrader/horisont-dokument-english.pdf 
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objective makes use of a deductive strategy by utilizing and testing pre-existing 
theory, the second objective utilizes a distinctively inductive strategy to discover how 
Israeli and Palestinian respondents view their world.  A qualitative research strategy is 
therefore applied as the intent is to “discover the meaning that participants attach to 
their behavior, how they interpret situations, and what their perspectives are on 
particular issues” (Woods 2006, 3).  
 
The design of the study itself is constructed as a cross-sectional survey with case study 
elements.  In his 3rd edition of “Social Research Methods,” Bryman (2008, 44) notes 
that cross-sectional research designs are those that collect data “on more than one case 
at a single point in time in order to collect a body of quantitative or quantifiable data.” 
Cross-sectional research, in contrast to longitudinal research, is used to take a snapshot 
of the attitudes of a subset of a population at a particular moment in time rather than 
tracking changes in attitudes.  Bailey (1994, 36) argues that a major advantage of such 
a design is that it allows for a large amount of comparable data, which is not affected 
by changes over time, to be collected.   
 
The unique context of religious leaders the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, however, 
requires greater attention to the specific attributes of the leaders and their 
surroundings.  Bryman (2008, 55) acknowledges such situations, arguing that a 
researcher often cannot generate findings in many cross-sectional analyses without 
reference to the special characteristics of the case being studied. This study therefore 
utilizes several case-study strategies to frame the data.  According to Gall et al. (1996, 
549), case studies are research projects which are constructed to “richly describe, 
explain, or assess and evaluate a phenomenon [e.g., event, person, program, etc.]”.  
Case study research allows for in-depth analysis of complex issues and allows for a 
“detailed consideration of contextual factors” of a particular case (George and Bennet 
2005, 19).  Case studies aim to provide rich accounts of contextual particularities, 
which is essential for analyzing peoples’ behavior and attitudes (Bryman 2008, 380-
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387).  The primary unit of analysis is Muslim, Christian, and Jewish religious leaders 
in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories. 
 
The rationale for utilizing a combination of two research designs is related to the 
strengths and weaknesses of both.  First, in an ongoing conflict like the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, changes on the ground can quickly affect attitudes and perceptions 
of respondents.  Since this study aims to identify key possibilities and limitations of 
interreligious track-II diplomacy overall rather than tracking particular events that 
influence fluctuations of perceptions, a cross-sectional survey best provides a snapshot 
of current attitudes of religious leaders.  This allows for focus on the wider picture of 
interreligious track-II diplomacy between Israelis and Palestinians instead of focusing 
on isolated events that may trigger particular perceptions.  Second, since this cross-
sectional survey does not explore perceptions of all Israelis and Palestinians, and can 
undoubtedly be considered a small –n study, integrating case-study elements allows for 
greater exploration into the particular context of religious leaders. By including case-
study features, the findings can be better situated within the wider context of 
respondents’ lived realities.  
 
3.2 Methodology  
 
Over a six-week period in 2011, thirteen semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with religious leaders (hereto referred to as “respondents”) in Israel and the occupied 
Palestinian territories, primarily in the Jerusalem area (see Figure 3.1). Selection of 
respondents was done through purposive snowball sampling19, primarily based on 
recommendations of local NGOs and the respondents themselves. For the sake of 
consistency and internal validity, “religious leaders” were operationalized as actors 
                                            
19 Bryman (2008, 415) defines purposive sampling as a “non-probability form of sampling.  The researcher does 
not seek to sample research participants on a random basis.”  The goal of such sampling is to identify 
participants in a strategic way so that they will be relevant to the questions being posed.  Snowball sampling 
refers to process of making initial contact with a small group of relevant interviewees, and then using these 
contacts to establish further contacts with others (2008, 184). 
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who were holding (or had previously held) leadership positions in religious institutions 
or organizations, and who were motivated and inspired by their spiritual and religious 
traditions, principles, or values.  For the Christian and Jewish communities, identifying 
such actors was fairly straightforward due to the hierarchical structure of senior 
religious clergy.  Identifying Muslim leadership tended to be more challenging due to 
differences in the organizational structure of Muslim religious institutions and 
communities. Thus, I identified Islamic leadership as Muslim actors who held (or have 
held) high profile, elite positions in religious institutions.   
 
Respondents were limited to those who have participated in, or who are currently 
participating in, interreligious initiatives between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians 
living in the occupied territories (Jerusalem included).  As a result, this research does 
not include the voices of actors who have participated solely in interreligious activities 
between members of their own ethnic group. Additionally, it does not include religious 
leadership in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories who have never taken part 
in interreligious initiatives.  While a number of respondents stressed the necessity of 
speaking with members of religious identity groups generally not participating in 
interreligious efforts (i.e. Ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities, Jewish settler groups, 
Hamas), the scope of this research does not allow for their inclusion.  Finally, religious 
actors who do not identify themselves as either Israeli or Palestinian are not part of this 
research.  Thus, non-local actors who have participated in interreligious efforts in the 
region are excluded from the data. 
 
While this research does not claim to have achieved a representative sample of the 
populations, special consideration was given to collecting data on a wide range of 
Palestinians and Israelis within religious groups.  Interviews were therefore conducted 
with approximately the same number of Israelis (six) as Palestinians (seven), with 
respondents further selected based on diversity of denomination/religious movement.   
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Out of the six Jewish respondents, two identified as part of the Orthodox Jewish 
movement, while the other four identified as part of the Modern Orthodox, 
Progressive, Reform, and Conservative Jewish movements respectively. Amongst the 
Christian respondents, two identified as Latin Catholic with the third identifying as 
Anglican.  Further attempts, albeit unsuccessful, were made to interview respondents 
! ! ! !"#$%&'()*+!"#$%&'(%)!*%+,-#.%#$+!!!
Muslims: 
• Sheikh Mostfa al!Tawel – Shari’ah High Court Judge / Secretary of the 
Shari’ah Supreme Judicial Council of Palestine 
• Sheikh Dr. Ekrima Sa’eed Sabri – former Grand Mufti of Jerusalem / 
Chief of Islamic Supreme Committee of Palestine / Orator of the Al-Aqsa 
Mosque 
• Salah A. Zuheika – Deputy Minister of Al-Waqf and Religious Affairs for 
the Palestinian Authority 
 
Jews: 
 
• Oded Wiener  – Director General, Chief Rabbinate of Israel 
• Rabbi Levi Weiman-Kelman – Head Rabbi, Kehilat Kol HaNeshama 
• Rabbi David Rosen – Honorary Advisor to the Chief Rabbinate of Israel on 
Interreligious Affairs 
• Rabbi Michael Melchior – former MK / founding member of Alexandria 
Process  
• Rabbi Jeremy Milgrom  – co-founder and co-director of Clergy for Peace 
• Dr. Ron Kronish – Director/Founder of The Interreligious Coordinating 
Council in Israel (ICCI) 
 
Christians: 
 
• Patriarch Michel Sabah – Patriarch Emeritus Of Jerusalem - Roman 
Catholic Latins 
• Rev Canon Hosam Naoum – Dean and Assistant to the Anglican Bishop  
• Father Jamal Khader – Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem !
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from other Christian denominations.  All four of the Muslim respondents identified as 
themselves as Sunni, the predominate branch of Islam found in the occupied 
Palestinian territories.  Muslim respondents offered no further religious or political 
affiliation.   
 
Interviews consisted of approximately one-hour meetings with each respondent, 
generally held at their respective places of work. Exceptions were made with two 
interviews that were held in respondents’ homes.  An interview guide with around 10 
questions was administered for each interview (see Appendix B), but the interviews 
themselves were semi-structured in format.  The semi-structured interview format was 
chosen to allow for greater flexibility and emphasis on what the interviewee viewed as 
important in explaining and understanding events, patterns, and behaviors (Bryman 
2008, 438).  Respondents were first given the opportunity to speak about their own 
experiences, and then questions revolved around three basic categories:  the role of 
religion in the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians; personal experiences with 
inter-faith work; and the possibilities of political solutions to evolve from 
interreligious work.   
 
3.3 Analysis 
 
The majority of the interviews were conducted in the English language, with three 
interviews conducted with the assistance of an Arabic translator.  Each interview was 
recorded, and was later directly translated and transcribed into English.  A copy of the 
translated English transcription was sent to the Arabic-speaking participants for 
approval.  Data from each case was subsequently classified and analyzed according to 
general themes that emerged from the research.  Themes were identified as statements 
of meanings that 1.) run through all or most of the pertinent data, or 2.) carry heavy 
emotional or factual impact in the minority (Ely et al. 1997, 150).  A content analysis 
of the data was then conducted according to themes, general patterns, and responses 
rather than individual words, sentences, or paragraphs.  While the data provided a 
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countless number of intriguing themes, I have chosen to focus the themes deemed 
most salient in relation to my research objectives. 
 
Interpretation of the themes and its relationship to the theory was conducted through 
what is commonly referred to as an interpretivist epistemology.  In other words, 
interpretation and the search for meaning arose from the perspective of the 
respondents. Analysis of the themes remained very near to the empirical data itself to 
avoid over-generality or misinterpretation of the respondents. 
 
3.4 Ethical Considerations 
 
Given the sensitive nature of conducting interviews with actors in an active conflict, 
special consideration was taken to protect the identities of respondents if requested.  At 
the commencement of each interview, participants were asked to give voluntary, 
informed consent, administered both on paper and orally, in which they could opt to 
have their information anonymized (see Appendix A).  Participants were able to 
withdraw at any point during or after the interview without having to justify it further, 
and participants could request to have portions of the interview left out of the final 
study. Whereas all but one of the respondents agreed to have their personal 
information and opinions published in the study, the analysis of the data sometimes is 
presented anonymously to preserve some degree of anonymity amidst the current 
political context in the region. 
 
The study was reported to and approved by the Data Protection Official for Research 
at the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) according to their guidelines.  
 
3.5 Research Validity and Bias 
 
Although some qualitative researchers have argued that the term validity is not 
necessarily applicable to qualitative research, the need for some kind of qualifying 
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check on the research remains.  Thus, this research uses Woods’ (2006, 4) 
conceptualization of qualitative research validity as seeking to adequately capture the 
meanings understood by the respondents. In order to maximize this, Woods argues that 
validity of qualitative research rests upon three main features:  unobtrusive, sustain 
methods; respondent validation; and triangulation.  First, when discussing unobtrusive 
methods, Woods contends that the researcher should leave the situation as undisturbed 
as possible.  Special consideration was taken through the anonymization of the data, as 
well as through informed consent, to ensure this component.   
 
Next, Woods argues that one of the best way of testing if the research has represented 
the respondents’ correctly is to allow for respondents to validate their responses (2006, 
4).  As discussed above, respondents were given the opportunity to remove sections of 
their interview after the interview was completed.20  Furthermore, the translations of 
the Arabic-to-English transcriptions were sent to the participants for validation.  
Finally, Woods argues that triangulation can serve as an important tool to maximize 
validity.  Triangulation is the use of more than one method or source of data to cross-
check findings of a social phenomenon (Bryman 2008, 700). As Mathison (1988, 13) 
argues, “Triangulation has risen an important methodological issue in naturalistic and 
qualitative approaches to evaluation [in order to] control bias and establishing valid 
propositions because traditional scientific techniques are incompatible with this 
alternate epistemology.”  While this was not always feasible due to a lack of previous 
data on field, the findings were compared and verified with previous research projects, 
literature, reports, and key informants whenever possible.  
  
In order to address the potential biases that may affect the work, I strove to maintain a 
critical and self-reflexive mindset throughout the research process.  According to 
Primeau  (2003), self-reflexivity is a quantitative research strategy of self-critique and 
self-appraisal used to address the subjectivity of the researcher.  Through self-
                                            
20 Two respondents requested that particular sections of their interview be omitted from the analysis. 
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reflexivity, a researcher becomes aware of themselves in the research by continually 
scrutinizing “what we know’ and ‘how we know it’” (2003, 10).  In other words, I 
aimed to understand how previously held positions and interests may affect my 
interpretation and presentation of the data.  Given prior knowledge of the power 
discrepancies between Israelis and Palestinians, I intentionally attempted to serve as an 
unobtrusive data-gathering instrument through listening and observing rather than 
actively participating in the interviews.  Additionally, I carefully monitored a number 
of potential biases of qualitative research identified by Woods (2006, 94):  slant; 
unwarranted and hidden use of persuasive rhetoric; unwarranted claims to generality; 
use of certain non-neutral, loaded words slipped in unobtrusively; thin evidence to 
support strong assertions; and the researcher’s mind made up in advance/closed to 
other possibilities.   
 
While it is impossible to be entirely objective in qualitative research, I was mindful of 
the propensity of my own views and interests to influence my interpretation, and I 
carefully considered these potential biases through the duration of this project. 
 
3.6 Methodological Challenges 
 
The study did encounter a few methodological challenges. First, political events in the 
region, namely the release of the “wikileaks” Palestine Papers, unrest in Egypt, 
Bahrain, and Tunisia, and further Israeli settlement building in the West Bank, 
dominated the news throughout the duration of this study.  Several respondents 
continually referred back to these events throughout the interviews, and often were 
quite reluctant to depart from such topics.  Given this tendency, a few of the interviews 
became much more structured as the interview commenced in order to gain insight on 
issues salient to my research objectives. Careful attention was given not to lead the 
interviews, yet this was a daunting task.   
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Another challenge was gaining access to particular religious leaders.  Given the 
political sensitivities of the conflict, several religious leaders were reluctant to meet 
with an international researcher.  Several respondents noted that researchers and the 
press had previously twisted their words in incorrect ways, thereby making them 
apprehensive to meet with a researcher again.  On quite a few occasions, appointments 
for interviews could not be set up without a clear reference from another religious 
leader.  For this reason, many interviews tended to be with like-minded individuals 
due to personal referrals from colleagues and friends.  While this could be perceived as 
a serious limitation towards the validity of the study, respondents themselves identified 
the difficulty of recruiting non-like-minded participants as a key challenge for 
interreligious efforts in the region.  See section 5.3 for further discussion on this topic. 
 
In the case of the Jewish respondents, 5 out of 6 interviews were conducted with 
Israelis who had either North American or Western European backgrounds and had 
immigrated to Israel in their adult life.  Only one respondent was actually Israeli-born.  
While this originally was perceived as a limitation to the research, one Jewish 
respondent verified that this might actually be a fairly representative sample of Jewish 
interreligious participants in the region.  As he observed, the Jewish clergy involved 
“are almost overwhelmingly people who have made aliya from Europe and North 
America.  In other words, the Jews who have a history of knowing what its like to be 
the minority and can identity what it must be like to be a Palestinian Muslim or 
Christian living in a Jewish majority.”21 
 
Finally, a majority of the Muslim respondents to this survey generally were much 
more reluctant to share personal views on interreligious initiatives in the region than 
Jewish or Christian participants. More concretely, they generally responded to 
questions with very short, precise, and carefully worded answers rather than thick 
descriptions of their views.  While their responses and experiences were certainly 
                                            
21 Rabbi Levi Weiman-Kelman, Personal interview, Jerusalem, February 2011. 
 
 
 
 
30 
integrated into the analysis, a majority of the specific quotations presented in this 
thesis are from Christian and Jewish respondents.  It is unknown if this pattern was 
cultural, political, or coincidental. Yet, some of the Muslim respondents undeniably 
appeared to be quite cautious, or perhaps even fearful, of their thoughts being openly 
published. 
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4. Toward a Model of Interreligious Track-
II Diplomacy 
 
A number of factors must be established in order to explore the extent to which current 
interreligious initiatives in the Holy Land can, or cannot, be characterized as track-II 
diplomacy.  First, religion and interreligious activities in the Holy Land take place in a 
particular context.  Without the contextual background of the initiatives, it is 
impossible to accurately frame the strengths and limitations of track-II interreligious 
initiatives between Israelis and Palestinians.  This chapter therefore begins with an 
account of how both scholars and religious leaders in Israel and the occupied 
Palestinian territories perceive the role of religion in the conflict dynamics between the 
parties (4.1).  Next, utilizing previous research carried out by Landau (2003) and Abu-
Nimer et al. (2007), I provide an account of the array of current interreligious 
initiatives taking place in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories (4.2).   
 
Building from the theoretical framework of track-II diplomacy established in Chapter 
2, I then continue by constructing a model for what constitutes “interreligious track-II 
diplomacy” as distinguished from other forms of interreligious initiatives (4.3).  I 
argue that the initiatives must a.) include semi-elite religious leadership as opposed to 
grassroots actors and must b.) place special focus on the political dimensions of the 
conflict rather than solely spiritual dimensions.  Finally, I examine the goals of the 
initiatives I have identified as interreligious track-II diplomacy to explore the extent 
that they are consistent with other traditional track-II models (4.4).  Such an analysis is 
necessary to examine if activities that seemingly appear to be track-II diplomacy 
actually have an entirely different aim when involving religious actors. 
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4.1 The Role of Religion in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
 
Scholars generally acknowledge that religion is not the dominant force in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, yet it would be an error to say that it is not a factor at all in the 
entire intractable equation.  Religion is often cited as one of the numerous intertwined, 
co-dependent factors that contribute to the conflict’s longevity. As Cohen (2005, 347) 
observes in his account of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the subtext of religiously-
based perceptions and actions ultimately exacerbate the conflict’s intractability.  
 
In their volume on religious holy places in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Breger et al. 
(2010) suggest that religion and politics often undergo a process that they refer to as 
coupling.  Issues of theological or spiritual virtue connected to one geographically 
determined locality, man-made structure, or natural object become intertwined with 
the political importance placed on that space.  By calling a space sacred, one group 
essentially claims attachment to or legitimate ownership of it.  In many cases, the 
“sacredness” of the symbol or space is elevated for political ends by exploiting the 
emotional intensity a holy place generates.  The sacred space is utilized as a common 
denominator for the unification of a people, and also as a boundary line for who is 
excluded.  In other cases, sacred localities serve as an “inexhaustible source of 
meaning and symbol of ethnic and religious identity” that parties are willing to fight 
and die over (2010, 4).  Thus, for many Israelis and Palestinians, places of religious 
significance in the region, including the land itself, serve as “political theatre[s] in 
large measure because of the exclusivity that religious groups seek to attach to what 
they view as ‘their’ place,” and simultaneously, to demonstrate who does not have 
claim to it (2010, 13). 
 
The coupling of religion and politics is an unmistakable characteristic of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  While the religious dimensions of unrest in the Holy Land can be 
traced throughout the history of the Roman Empire, the Crusades, and the Ottoman 
Empire, most scholars focused on the contemporary conflict point to an intensified 
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manipulation of religious identities with the emergence of primarily secular Zionist 
ideologies in the mid-1800s. Zionist thinkers stressed the need for a homeland for 
European Jews in historic Palestine, articulating an historical, even theological, 
connection to the land as a means to acquire legitimacy.22  By 1947, U.N. Resolution 
181 proposed the partition of the land into an Arab and a Jewish state, and European 
Jews began to define the boundaries of their new state based on Biblical interpretations 
of the ancient Israelites (Akenson 1992, 175-177). After the Six Day War in 1967, 
which resulted in the Israeli occupation of the East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the 
Gaza Strip, the explicitly religious attachment to the land became evermore prominent.  
According to Bennett (2008, 174) biblically-minded Jews served as in the forefront of 
settlement movement in the West Bank and Gaza after the Six Day War.  Breger et al. 
(2010, 7) note that Israeli government continues to “‘discover’ numerous holy sites in 
Judea and Samaria [the West Bank], all serving to legitimate and reinforce Jewish 
presence.”  
 
On the Palestinian side, religious leaders have employed Muslim and Christian 
religious identities to rally popular support.  Abu-Nimer et al. (2007, 44) note that 
Palestinian national leaders such as then-Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Haj Amin al- 
Hussieni used Islamic religious identity to rally support for resistance movements 
against British and Zionist colonialism in the 1930s.  Muslim communities were called 
to rescue Islamic domain and the divine blessed land (ard al-baraka) from non-
Muslim control (Breger et al. 2010, 6). By the mid-1980s, substantial elements of the 
Palestinian liberation struggle, a traditionally secular, nationalistic struggle, were 
employed using Islamist language (Bennett 2008).  Political parties based in religious 
ideology, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, gained influence during the First 
Palestinian Intifada (Hroub 2000).  By the Second Intifada, commonly referred to as 
the religiously-framed ‘Al-Aqsa Intifada’ due to then-Israeli Defense Minister Ariel 
Sharon’s public visit outside the Al-Aqsa mosque in 2000, scholars have argued that 
“the religious factor is constantly growing in the framing of the Israeli-Palestinian 
                                            
22 See Bar (2010) for further discussion on the use of sacred symbols in Zionist movements. 
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conflict as an existential and religious-identity-based conflict” (Abu-Nimer 2004, 
492). 
 
National and political narratives, often framed through religious symbolism and 
mythology, continue to overlap, compete, and in many ways shape the political 
conflict itself.  The lines between Jews, Muslims, and Christians become deeply drawn 
and identities are portrayed as zero-sum identities in which the validity of one group is 
perceived as a negation of the other (Moix 2006).  Thus, as Abu-Nimer (2004, 492) 
observes, “religious identities (symbols, rituals, and values) clearly and crucially 
impact the perceptions and behaviors even of those Israelis and Palestinians who do 
not define themselves as religious or observant.” In other words, due to the coupling of 
religion and politics in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, “it is not a question of whether 
religion is involved, but how it is involved” (Khalil 2010, 47). 
 
Muslim, Christian, and Jewish leaders interviewed for this study tended to agree with 
the prevailing academic assertion that that conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is 
not primarily religious in nature.  When questioned if the conflict between the two 
populations was a religious conflict, every respondent to this study, with no 
exceptions, responded assertively that it was not. Respondents cited, among other 
things, national identity, self-determination, sovereignty, resources, and territory when 
they spoke of the origins of the conflict. Yet, even with such assured responses, every 
religious leader acknowledged that religion does, somehow, play into the conflict 
dynamics between the two populations. Three themes generally emerged to illustrate 
this.   
 
First, the majority of respondents identified religion as a primary source of identity for 
both Israelis and Palestinians.  As one Christian leader expressed, “Religion is 
essential in the personality of everyone here in the Middle East. To the Muslim, the 
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Jew, and to the Christian.”23  Jewish participants tended to express that Jewish 
nationality, even for secular Jews, is tied to the Jewish religion, history, and culture.  
The Jewish national movement exhibited strong religious sentiments, and continues to 
embody strong religious connotations. Muslim leaders, while tending to articulate an 
attachment to their Palestinian identity as well, pointed out that their identity as 
Muslim is integrated into all parts of their life.  All Christian leaders also cited their 
Christian faith as a key-identifying attribute of their community.   
 
Second, some religious leaders articulated that religion is being used as a form of a 
political instrument, sometimes used by one party to justify action against another.24 
Responses varied as to exactly who was using religion to justify actions, with views 
ranging from the respective governments themselves to extremist groups on both sides.  
Respondents who identified religion’s role as a political instrument nevertheless 
articulated that such uses were contrary to the ideals of each of the respective 
religions.  Several Palestinians referred to what they perceived as the intentional 
“Judaization” of the area by the Israeli government in order to claim legitimacy. 
Several Israeli religious leaders argued that Islamic extremists have used religion as 
rationale for previous suicide bombings against civilians.   
 
Finally, a majority of leaders from all three religious groups articulated a concern that 
religion is becoming a growing force in the conflict, especially in recent years.  While 
the conflict may not have originally started as one between religious groups, 
inattention to the religious dimensions of the conflict exacerbates and isolates those 
with strong religious identities.  Extremist voices then fill what one respondent 
referred to as a “vacuum” that is left by ignoring religion all together.  As one Muslim 
leader observed: 
 
                                            
23 Personal interview, Jerusalem, February 2011. 
24 The term political instrument is used to describe actions which are perceived as being done for political 
purposes but are not explicitly expressed as such. 
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Before 1948, during the mandate period, and even before the Ottoman period here in 
Palestine – there was no difference between Jews, Muslims, and Christians.  They 
were working together; they were making companies and factories together. They 
were partners…there was no room for such a kind of religious conflict.  It was never 
according to a religious basis up until, you may say, just a few years ago.  Now we are 
witnessing changes inside of the Israeli community, and of course inside the 
Palestinian community, as people on both sides change the nature of the conflict.25   
 
To many respondents, the religious dimensions of the conflict are becoming stronger 
and more dominating, an issue that was commonly cited as problematic.  As one 
Jewish leader expressed, “This [conflict] is a political one.  Political conflicts are more 
easily resolvable than religious conflict.  Political conflicts, you can compromise.  
Religious conflicts- it is much harder to compromise,”26 indicating a perception that 
religious identities can be often interpreted as zero-sum.  
 
4.2 Interreligious Initiatives in the Holy Land 
 
Although it is apparent that religion often serves as a definite dividing line between 
populations, such a divide has not entirely stopped Muslims, Christian, and Jewish 
individuals from meeting with each other.  Two research projects in particular, namely 
that of Yehezkel Landau (2003) and Abu-Nimer, Khoury, and Welty (2007), provide 
valuable knowledge on current interreligious initiatives being conducted between 
Muslims, Christians, and Jews in the Holy Land.  
 
In his landmark study for the United States Institute of Peace, Landau (2003), an 
Israeli Jewish Rabbi and a well-known figure in interfaith dialogue, interviewed over 
30 Jewish, Christian, and Muslim clerics, educators, and peace activists in the region 
to better map out the range of interreligious activities occurring between Palestinians 
and Israelis.  Drawing on the personal testimonies of his respondents, Landau 
identified five different categories of interreligious initiatives in Israel and the 
                                            
25 Salah A. Zuheika, Personal interview, Al-Azaria, January 2011. 
26 Personal interview, Jerusalem, February 2011. 
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occupied Palestinian territories, defining them as grassroots peacebuilding, education 
programs, symbolic ritual, active solidarity, and personal grief/collective compassion.  
To Landau, grassroots peacebuilding refers to projects that bring Jews, Christians, and 
Muslims together to discuss their respective faith traditions on a non-leadership level.  
This can involve gathering of participants to share meals, discuss texts, celebrate 
various religious holidays, or inter-faith lectures (2003, 26-29).  Landau noted that this 
was the most frequently occurring activity between the populations.  The next model, 
education programs, are those that aim specifically at schoolteachers since their 
influence is primarily on the next generation.  These activities include workshops with 
teachers and principals who are then “encouraged to bring a pluralistic awareness and 
commitment to their students” (2003, 29). Such initiatives aim to change attitudes 
regarding religion and tolerance, emphasizing that shared knowledge be transferred to 
schools and wider communities.  Initiatives within this category did not necessarily 
include religiously affiliated participants, but instead focused on larger questions 
regarding religion. 
 
The next category, symbolic ritual, describes activities that focus specifically on the 
spiritual orientation of participants.  These initiatives combine “social action with 
spiritual disciples like prayer and medication” to offer integrated support to inner and 
outer peace (2003, 35).   This can include meeting to pray, worship, and celebrate 
together.  Activities in this category tend to avoid political activities to focus on 
collective spirituality.  Next, active solidarity refers to activities that involve religious 
persons who focus on social and ethical issues facing both the Israeli and Palestinian 
communities.27  This can include attending protests or putting on education programs 
concerning salient issues of the conflict, and it is often done through human rights 
organizations such as Rabbis for Human Rights.  Finally, activities categorized as from 
personal grief to collective compassion include those in which different religious 
communities share their experiences with personal tragedy together in hopes of finding 
                                            
27 See Landau (2003), pages 38-40 for further discussion. 
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peace through joint grieving.  These activities again do not necessarily require 
religiously affiliated participants, but aim to touch the spiritual reservoirs of 
compassion for “wide and powerful impact on public opinion through media 
campaigns, presentations at schools and community centers, and press coverage” 
(2003, 42). 
 
The work of Abu-Nimer et al. (2007) provides a more nuanced approach to 
interreligious initiatives in the region.  Conducted around the same time as Landou’s 
study, the team surveyed the various structures and themes of inter-faith efforts 
between religions in five Middle Eastern settings, including those efforts carried out 
between Palestinians and Israelis. Over the course of an eight-month period during the 
Second Palestinian Intifada, the team conducted interviews with forty-five active inter-
faith dialogue participants in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories. They 
aimed to identify the goals, assumptions, and motivations of participants.  The results 
of the study found that, in 2003, approximately fifteen different organizations in Israel 
and the occupied Palestinian territories were founded on an inter-faith or religious 
framework.  A majority of these organizations operated inside of Israel with an aim of 
Arab-Israeli coexistence. There was occasional engagement with Palestinians currently 
living in the occupied territories, but this was mainly limited to Palestinians in 
Jerusalem alone (2007, 79).   
 
The research overwhelmingly found that the dominant structure of efforts between 
Israelis and Palestinians were what they considered “cognitive” or “doctrinal 
scientific” dialogue between lay people, a practice in which religious groups primarily 
compare religious traditions in an attempt to learn more about the other faiths and the 
nature of religion as a whole (Abu-Nimer et al. 2007, 53).  This model assumes that 
change occurs through learning and understanding, and that misinformation and the 
lack of information can be significant causes of conflict and interreligious tension 
(Abu-Nimer et al. 2007, 220).  Activities between Israelis and Palestinians tended to 
begin with interpersonal and group activities to break the ice and build personal 
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relationships, and would move to presentations on a given theme that was identified by 
the organizers.  In the cognitive setting, the activities would deliberately exclude 
political issues or conversations about resolving the conflict in an effort to focus the 
conversation to solely issues of spirituality, religious texts, and rituals.   
 
The same doctrinal scientific model also dominated meetings between religious clergy 
and theologians in the region. Exercises tended to focus on the difference and 
similarities in theological interpretations of religious texts rather than the actual 
relationship between the two groups.  Each of the participants would deliver a 
presentation on an agreed upon theme, and the remaining participants would offer their 
thoughts in the highly intellectual setting.  The apolitical interfaith encounters sought 
to emphasize harmony and positive connectors between the different religious groups 
or individuals rather than political differences (Abu-Nimer et al. 2007, 61). 
 
When examining the work of Landau and Abu-Nimer et al., it is clear that there is no 
uniform model for interreligious initiatives in the Holy Land. It is evident, however, 
that a majority of interreligious initiatives place emphasis on a spiritual exchange 
rather than political discussion. Landau’s categories of spiritual ritual, education, and 
grassroots peacebuilding arguably fall into the category of “doctrinal scientific” 
dialogues identified by Abu-Nimer et al.  Focus is placed on the spiritual elements of 
the relationship in an attempt to bridge similarities rather than political divisions.  The 
activities attempt to support peace by the dissemination of knowledge with 
participants, and hopefully with the larger public.   
 
4.3 Identifying Interreligious Track-II Diplomacy 
 
Given the wide range of interreligious initiatives currently occurring between Israelis 
and Palestinians, it would be a vast oversimplification to assume that all interreligious 
initiatives can automatically be characterized as track-II diplomacy.  Each of the 
activities described by Landou and Abu-Nimer et al. have different goals, participants, 
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and underlying assumptions of how to support peace. Thus, one must examine the 
theoretical assumptions and goals of track-II diplomacy in order to identify which 
initiatives can specifically be consider ‘interreligious track-II diplomacy’ in contrast to 
other forms of peacebuilding.   
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, scholars have been unable to reach consensus on the actual 
format and design of track-II diplomatic efforts. Consequently, identifying an 
interreligious track-II model is a more nuanced task than solely substituting religious 
actors into traditionally secular positions. One must consider the central goals and 
assumptions of track-II diplomacy, namely that: 
 
a.) the efforts must be based on the fundamental belief that interactions between the 
adversarial groups in an unofficial setting will help improve relations between the two 
parties and  
 
b.) the initiatives are built on the assumption “the improved relations and jointly 
formulated ideas are transferred and incorporated into the society and/or the official 
policymaking processes, thus, having an impact at a larger scale” (Cuhadar 2009, 
641). 
 
Building from these theoretical assumptions, I argue that two defining characteristics 
are necessary to distinguish interreligious track-II initiatives from other models of 
peacebuilding: the utilization of religious leadership and attention to the overall 
political relationship of the parities.  
 
Track-II diplomacy assumes that participants have political influence on both the 
horizontal and vertical relationships of the conflict.  Such a position aids in bridging 
the “critical divides that complicate and often retard the process of conflict 
transformation ... [including] the divisions between government and civil society, 
between elite and grassroots levels within communities, and between different cultural 
worldviews and assumptions about how to manage conflict and change” (Davies and 
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Kaufman 2002, 3-4).  For this reason, participants in track-II diplomacy generally hold 
a somewhat elite position in society rather than members of the grassroots 
movements.28 
 
The same can be said for interreligious track-II diplomacy.  In order for an 
interreligious initiative to be considered track-II diplomacy, it must utilize participants 
that represent mid-range or elite religious positions in society.  In most cases, this 
would mean religious clergy or clerics who hold prominent positions in synagogues, 
churches, mosques, or religious institutions. Leaders are in a prime position to reach 
both the vertical and horizontal relationships in the conflict as they represent the 
voices of a larger segment in the society rather than solely their own.  As Villumstad 
(2002, 19) writes, “Religious leaders have direct access both to the grassroots level 
and to the top leadership level…Their strategic potential to make a difference in 
conflicts is considerable, and transcends different levels in national and international 
contexts.”  Activities that place emphasis on average laypersons with religious 
affiliation, but are not in position to affect greater masses of public policy, should not 
be characterized as track-II diplomacy at all.  Instead, they could represent another 
field known as citizens’ diplomacy, which places analysis on grassroots actors, and has 
its own assumptions and aims.29 
 
In addition to the utilization of religious leaders in mid-range or elite positions, 
interreligious track-II diplomacy seeks to address the political dimensions of the 
interaction.  Track-II diplomacy is built on the assumption that the ideas generated 
from the interaction will be transmitted into tangible shifts in policy through formal 
track-I efforts.  Hence, track-II diplomacy involves “policy-related, problem-solving 
dialogue” in which “elements of the overall political relationship” or other areas of 
competition are explicitly addressed (Saunders 1991, 49). If the initiatives opt to focus 
                                            
28 Appleby (2000, 223) refers to the use of top-level religious leadership as the “elite leadership model.”  This 
provides direct access to each of the religion’s resources of personnel and infrastructure. 
29 See Demant (1996) for further discussion on citizens’ diplomacy. 
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solely on “getting to know the other” through spiritual or cultural exchanges, they can 
instead be distinguished as “people-to-people” diplomatic initiatives rather than track-
II diplomacy.30   
 
Using the theoretical assumptions of track-II diplomacy, as well as the specifics of the 
interreligious initiatives in the region, I will thus define interreligious track-II 
diplomacy as unofficial dialogue of religious elites, focused on problem solving, with 
attention to both spiritual exchanges and the overall political relationship of the 
parties.  This theoretical definition places emphasis on the participation of religious 
elites rather than lay participants, but also stresses the necessity of addressing political 
components of the relationship.  This definition also helps to distinguish interreligious 
track-II diplomacy from “people-to-people” diplomacy, which focuses mainly on a 
cultural or spiritual exchange on a grassroots or elite level, and “citizens’ diplomacy,” 
which focuses on the overall political relationship but utilizes non-elite religious 
actors. 
 
One limitation of this theoretical definition certainly relates to the challenge of 
operationalizing what the “overall political relationship of the parties” actually entails. 
Especially in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the political and the 
religious elements of the relationship are frequently coupled, making it difficult to 
distinguish what is actually a religious question from political questions.  For this 
reason, some of the most contentious religiously sensitive issues (i.e. holy sites, the 
future of Jerusalem, the status of the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount) are intimately 
linked with a myriad of political issues such as, inter alia, legal jurisdiction, access, 
archeological protection, property rights, tax laws, and minority rights (Breger and 
Hammer 2010).  I will argue, however, that addressing the overall political 
relationship of the parties entails the discussion of participants’ day-to-day lived 
                                            
30 See Saunders (1991) for further discussion on people-to-people diplomacy. 
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realities (and perceptions of the conflict) rather than solely cultural or spiritual 
exchanges. 
 
When examining the range of interreligious initiatives outlined by Landou and Abu-
Nimer et al. through this theoretical definition, it becomes clear that the common 
assertion utilized by scholars of religion and peacebuilding that all forms of 
interreligious peacebuilding efforts are track-II diplomacy may be a 
mischaracterization.  A majority of the initiatives in the region, in fact, can not be 
characterized as track-II diplomacy since they either place focus on grassroots actors, 
or avoid political discussions all together.  The dominant model between Israelis and 
Palestinians, identified by Abu-Nimer et al. (2007, 53) as “cognitive” or “doctrinal 
scientific” model, is the most utilized model in the region yet cannot be considered 
track-II diplomacy.  These initiatives place emphasis on comparing traditions to learn 
about the nature of religion and harmony between parties.  Unless the doctrinal 
scientific dialogues are used as a form of trust or confidence building at the beginning 
of an initiative’s tenure, it must be understood as a different form of peacebuilding.   
 
4.4 Goals of Track-II Interreligious Initiatives  
 
Although a majority of the initiates in the region are not track-II diplomacy, the 
aforementioned theoretical definition of interreligious track-II diplomacy allows for a 
great deal of diversity and flexibility in the actual format and goals of the initiatives 
that meet these criteria.  Just as there is no “one size fits all” for track-II diplomacy, 
interreligious track-II diplomacy can take on a number of forms.  Programs such as the 
Interreligious Coordinating Council in Israel’s (ICCI) KEDEM: Voices for Religious 
Reconciliation project, for example, bring together Rabbis, Christian Clergy, and 
Imams to engage in interreligious dialogue and exchange views on core issues of the 
conflict.  Clergy meet regularly over a pre-determined period of time to share stories 
and problem-solve together.  Other initiatives, such as the Council of the Religious 
Institutions of the Holy Land (CRIHL), place emphasis on institutional religious 
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leaders and have no pre-determined time limit.  The CRIHL meets regularly to 
promote mutual respect between the official religious institutions in the Holy Land, 
and has met with national and foreign political leaders on a number of occasions.  
Initiatives such as the Alexandria Process gather Israeli and Palestinian clergy in 
hopes of joint public action. The result of the Alexandria Process was joint declaration 
known as the “First Declaration of Alexandria of the Religious Leaders of The Holy,” 
calling for the end of violence and the resumption of the peace process.31  
 
Given this diversity, it is vital to gage whether the goals of interreligious track-II 
diplomacy actually resemble the goals of more traditional forms of track-II diplomacy, 
or if they aim to do something entirely different. When discussing the goals of 
initiatives that can be characterized as interreligious track-II diplomacy, four rather 
inter-related themes emerged:  bridging and humanizing; shifting the narrative to 
support peace; putting out “sparks” that might lead to outbreaks of violence; and 
instigating immediate changes in the political system.  
 
4.4.1 Bridging and Humanizing 
 
For many respondents, primarily Jewish leaders, an important goal and a regularly 
cited outcome of interreligious initiatives relates to the process of humanizing the 
other.  Given the current political atmosphere, many respondents articulated concern 
over the separation that occurs between populations.  Whether this is a result of 
physical division due to the Israeli separation barrier32, psychological barriers resulting 
from violence, media images of the other, or a combination of forces, a commonly 
expressed view is that interreligious initiatives can serve as a humanizing bridge. 
 
                                            
31 For more information on the Alexandria Process, see http://www.usip.org/programs/projects/alexandria-
process. 
32 The term “Israeli separation barrier” is the official term used by the United Nations to describe the 709- 
kilometer-long barrier built by the Israeli government. See OCHA (2010) for more information. 
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Rabbi Jeremy Milgrom, founder of a track-II initiative known as Clergy for Peace and 
self-described independent human rights advocate, emphasized the urgency of 
religious clergy engaging in such initiatives in order to understand the other.  Using 
the example of other professionals in the region to illustrate his thoughts, Rabbi 
Milgrom expressed that religious clergy may face even larger barriers than many other 
professions: 
 
You know how separate Palestinians and Israelis lives are. They rarely meet as peers.  
And out of all the professionals, clergy meet the least.  If you are a doctor, you use the 
same technology and work in the same institutions.  You can meet in scientific 
circumstances since diseases see no barriers.  But religion definitely has barriers!  The 
clergy tend to be less articulate in the languages of the other, since our training is so 
focused on our own traditions – digging deeper into the richness of our traditions.  We 
are perhaps the least equipped of all the profession to bridge the gap.  Thus, we need 
to aim to make this bridge.33 
 
Rabbi Milgrom therefore emphasized that a key aim of his work is to build such a 
bridge. Muslim, Jewish, and Christian leadership engaged in inter-faith work become 
“self-appointed ambassadors” who reach out in curiosity and hospitality to the other, 
and who make the visible statement that “our faiths can overcome the animosity that is 
filled with violence and terrible things.” 
 
Other Jewish leaders articulated similar sentiments.  Rabbi Michael Melchior, a 
founding member of the Alexandria Process and a former Israeli Knesset member 
(MK), articulated his concern with the divide between the two populations as a driving 
force that contributes to sustained conflict dynamics: 
 
The thing is, even though that we live in a very small area, even within the city of 
Jerusalem – we know nothing about each other!  We have even less knowledge of the 
other than before globalization.  You can live five minutes from each other, but on all 
sides – you don’t understand what ticks the other, what the other believes, what the 
historic and national narratives are.  More and more people are ignorant of each other, 
and they are more open to believing negative stereotypes.34 
                                            
33 Rabbi Jeremy Milgrom, Personal interview, Jerusalem, February 2011. 
34 Rabbi Michael Melchior, Personal interview, Jerusalem, February 2011. 
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He believes that religious leaders “no doubt” play a central role in propagating such 
negative stereotypes, and they thus must work to adjust such a sentiment within the 
larger populations.   
 
Another Jewish respondent described a project in which Muslim, Jewish, and Christian 
clergy met over the course of a five-year period to discuss their lives and other 
pertinent issues to better understand what the other thought and felt.  He experienced a 
wide range of goals and outcomes, but one of the most notable successes was the sense 
of responsibility for the other that emerged from the inter-faith encounter.  He 
expressed his experience in this way: 
 
Each side [Palestinians and Israelis] learned to recognize the existence of the other - 
the other’s stories, feelings, and issues.  This is opposed to what generally goes on in, 
let’s say, Jewish society in Israel. The majority of Palestinians are mostly invisible.  
They don’t exist.  It is called denial.  If we pretend they don’t exist, they will just go 
away.  But now…now I have MET somebody that I have known for a while. I now 
know what Palestinian leaders think and feel.  I now have a responsibility. The same 
can go with Palestinians.  Palestinian religious leaders- Imams, pastors - had never 
talked to rabbis before!  They might learn that not all rabbis, or Jews, think the same 
thing.  The rabbis have very different opinions!...They learn about diversity in the 
Jewish society.  They learn how complicated it really is.  It’s not as black and white as 
the Tabloids say.35   
 
One Jewish leader who serves on the CRIHL emphasized the personal connection he 
himself had formed with other religious leaders.  He recalled a moment when a 
Palestinian Christian bishop needed a favor from him:   
 
The fact that we can pick up the phone…that he feels comfortable to pick up the phone 
and ask me to assist him in a, b, c, d, e…Like, ‘tomorrow we have people from the 
world leaders of the churches – will you be so kind to talk to them about the issues 
here?’ The fact that we have made personal relationships between the people…this is a 
success.36   
 
                                            
35 Jewish leader, Personal interview, Jerusalem, January 2011. 
36 Oded Wiener, Personal interview, Jerusalem, January 2011. 
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He explained that the two continually send greetings to each other on holy days, and 
that the growth of their relationship can be compared to the building of a home.  “If the 
foundation is okay,” he explained, “then you can build the whole building.”  
 
While the majority of Palestinian respondents did not explicitly express bridging or 
humanizing as goals of their interreligious work, a few of the Palestinian Christians 
alluded to the process in other ways. Patriarch Emeritus of Jerusalem Michel Sabah, a 
Palestinian Catholic Archbishop, articulated that protecting human dignity is a key 
goal driving his inter-faith work.  One way that human dignity can be affirmed is 
through seeing the other as a fellow human being, despite the separation.  “When the 
enemy is no longer an enemy, and they are human person – that is success,” he 
explained.  “The Israeli is not only an enemy or a soldier – but he is a human person 
who speaks very friendly and about peace.  And the Palestinian is not an enemy or a 
terrorist – he is a friend that can talk about peace and justice.”37  By seeing the other as 
human, Patriarch Sabah believes that we have begun one part of protecting human 
dignity. 
 
A further sentiment articulated by a Palestinian Christian was related to the goal of 
addressing the ethical implications of theology.  Father Jamal Khader, a Catholic priest 
in Bethlehem, reflected on an interreligious initiative between Israelis and Palestinians 
in which theology itself served as barrier to seeing each other’s humanity.  His goal 
therefore was to engage the other in a way that would reveal the human implications of 
the theology:   
 
That dialogue – even the theological dialogue – has a direct implication on the ground.  
And as we usually say, theology may hurt…the theology itself is harmful for the 
Palestinians.  What you call sign of hope, or sign of the fidelity of God to his people -
you read it over and over in many places – a sign of fidelity to his people means a 
catastrophe for me.  It means millions of refugees. It means occupation for me. God 
and the word of God should be good news.  And you are making it bad news to me.38   
                                            
37 Patriarch Michel Sabah, Personal interview, Jerusalem, February 2011. 
38 Father Jamal Khader, Personal interview, Bethlehem, February 2011. 
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According to Father Khader, the inability to connect the ethical and the theological in 
the interreligious encounter could result in neglect of the implications of one’s 
theology on another’s humanity.39  Such a response exhibits strong parallels with the 
“hermeneutical gap” discussed by Little and Appleby (2004).  In the context of the 
Holy Land, respondents pointed out that religious worldviews often block the 
implications on the human person on the ground.  Thus, a goal of the initiatives is to 
bridge such a hermeneutical gap in order for humanity of parties to be fully 
recognized. 
 
Respondents tended to echo, with fairly accurate precision, the larger significance of 
track-II diplomacy as argued by Azar (2003) and Chigas (2005).  As established in 
section 2.2, advocates of track-II diplomacy generally argue that intractable conflicts 
are prolonged by the denial and suppression of fundamental human needs that are not 
always tangible.  Consequently, track-II processes “work directly to change the 
underlying human relationship and deals with perceptions, trust, and fears that fuel 
institutionalization and self-reinforcing dynamic that sustains intractability (Chigas 
2005, 125).  Muslim, Christian, and Jewish leaders highlighted their aim to break 
down such reinforcing stereotypes and misperceptions between populations.  
Especially in a political setting in which a physical wall serves as a tangible division 
between populations, one of the goals behind interreligious initiatives is to re-
humanize the other.  This can alleviate the fear and distrust that trigger hostile 
interactions between parties.   
 
4.4.2 Shifting the Narrative to Support Peace 
 
A second prominent theme that emerged from all three faith groups was the goal of 
shifting the narrative from religion being a destructive force to that of a constructive 
                                            
39 Father Khader’s thoughts on the connection between theology and political movement resembles the many of 
the thinkers behind Christian liberation theology, a political theology which interprets the teachings Jesus in 
terms of a liberation from unjust economic, political, or social condition.  For more information, see Ateek 
(1989). 
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support for peace. As noted previously in this chapter, several religious leaders in the 
Holy Land articulated a fear of the conflict becoming further “religionized” if it was 
not addressed.  Many perceived that their respective governments were not willing to 
address the religious dimensions, arguing that this leaves a vacuum for groups who are 
generally perceived to be extremists to step in and control the religious narrative.   
 
One common sentiment shared by a majority of respondents was that the collective 
narrative that religion is an exclusively negative force in the region contributes to 
continued conflict dynamics.  This narrative is perpetuated both by the media, the 
public, but also religious leaders themselves. As one Jewish leader articulated, 
“Israelis and Palestinians are not used to hearing their religious leaders talking in that 
language [of peace].  They tend to talk in terms of xenophobia, and nationalism, and 
victimhood.”40  Father Khader echoed the sentiment that the ongoing narrative 
presented by religious leaders is a major problem:   
 
I do believe that many Jewish, Muslim, and Christian religious leaders aim for peace, 
but I am not confident that all of them are doing that.  There is a lot of preaching of 
hatred...of war…of incitement.  The religious discourse is a dangerous one, and it is 
not the best right now…. There are a lot of religious leaders with good will.  But the 
voices of fundamentalists are much higher, and hurt much more than those people who 
believe in justice and peace.41 
 
From Father Khader’s perspective, one of the goals of interreligious work is to alter 
this destructive tendency of each religious group to create a constructive space where 
religious leaders can express the importance of diversity and peace to the greater 
society.  
 
Dr. Ron Kronish, an Israeli Jew and director of the ICCI, expressed his concern for the 
current destructive narrative in this way:  “Around these parts, religions  - typically 
Judaism and Islam – they are considered part of the problem, not part of the solution.  
The general idea, of course encouraged by the media, is that religions are extremisms, 
                                            
40 Weiman-Kelman, Personal interview. 
41 Khader, Personal interview. 
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like radical Islam and radical Judaism, and the moderate versions don’t get any media 
and they don’t exist in the public mind.”42  To Dr. Kronish, this collective narrative 
does considerable damage if society does not believe that religious actors can serve as 
peacemakers:   
 
If you were to go ask Joe Israeli in the street – can you name me five Rabbis that have 
spoken out for peace – they might be able to name one. And only a few people would 
know that. The thought of Rabbis, Imams, Qaadis, or Sheikhs speaking up for peace is 
an unknown idea in our public square…. In theory, if you could get 100 religious 
leaders talking a language of peace in this society – and on the radio – that might make 
a difference!43 
 
In other words, an important goal of inter-faith work is to change such a narrative 
since it may have an impact on larger society.  
 
A number of participants more specifically raised the concern that the current narrative 
that religious actors are opposed to working with each other and to working for peace 
can have a damaging effect on larger track-I efforts.  In particular, several Muslim, 
Christian, and Jewish respondents pointed to effects that such narratives from religious 
leaders had on the Oslo Accords of the 1990s and the 2000 Camp David Summit.44  
Rabbi Melchior, for example, argued that narratives from Jewish religious leadership 
directly delegitimized the Oslo process and contributed to its demise:   
 
If you look at the Jewish side, you see the phenomena of the deligitimization of the 
peace process by religious leaders after the Oslo Accords.  It was seen as being anti-
Jewish, or against the Jewish religion.  Especially in the national religious group in 
Israel, a very strong opposition that delegitimized the process and the people 
responsible for the process.  This led to the things like the assassination of our prime 
minister.  This was done totally out the group that demonized the people responsible 
for the process.  That assassination had a great impact on further political context.  The 
murderer succeeded at wanting to end the process, for sure.45 
 
                                            
42 Dr. Ron Kronish, Personal interview, Jerusalem, January 2011. 
43 Kronish, Personal interview. 
44 Several respondents spoke specifically about the absence of religious voices as one component of the Oslo 
Accords’ failure.  While further exploration of this question does not fall specifically within the scope of this 
study, this could be an interesting area for further research.   
45 Melchior, Personal interview.   
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According to Rabbi Melchior, the example of the assassination of Israeli Prime 
Minister Itzak Rabin by a right-wing Israeli radical in 1995 provides evidence of the 
destructive force that religion has played in the conflict.   
 
Respondents also expressed that changing the narrative could provide an interreligious 
safety net for political leaders to make difficult decisions toward peace, an 
instrumental function of track-II diplomacy argued by Montville (1987) and Kelman 
(2002). Rabbi Milgrom, for example, expressed that political leaders in the Holy Land 
consistently need to check to see how their religious communities feel about peace, 
creating major obstacles to moving the process forward. As he put it, “If there are 
politicians who have some fantasy of reaching compromise, and have to look over 
their shoulders to see where the religious communities are that are against compromise 
- primarily from those that think there is a divine prohibition between returning some 
land or working things out - this shows where religion is part of the problem.”46  Thus, 
his goal was to change the narrative “to bring religion in as part of the solution” in the 
form of safety net.  Rabbi Melchior shared the view that religious leaders can serve as 
a safety net for peace agreements: 
 
I think that we need to reach a point in which all religious leaders involved can say, 
from a religious point of view, that we accept the political agreement that is reached – 
that we support such an agreement. We will give it needed energy. If [political] 
leadership do their job and finalizes an agreement, we will give it the backing and the 
legitimization.  ‘This agreement is necessary from a religious perspective.  This is 
legitimate.  This is Kosher.’  Then everything will look different.47 
 
From his perspective, this is a necessary goal of interreligious initiatives and a 
necessary component of any future peace agreement. 
 
In addition to the instrumental function of creating a safety net, responses in this 
category suggest a desire that interreligious initiatives address larger issues than just 
                                            
46 Milgrom, Personal interview. 
47 Melchior, Personal interview. 
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the one-on-one relationship of participants.  Particularly, it indicated that a majority of 
religious leaders believe that the current narrative that religious actors only serve as a 
destructive force can have a larger, sustained impact on the conflict.  This is consistent 
with one of the underlying assumptions / aims of track-II diplomacy that “the 
improved relationships…are transferred and incorporated into the society and/or the 
official policymaking processes, thus having an impact at a larger scale” (Cuhadar 
2009:641).  While these findings cannot indicate to what extent such a transfer to the 
larger society is actually occurring, it is part of the participants’ intent.   
 
4.4.3 Preventing a “Spark” 
 
The third theme that commonly arose amongst respondents dealt with the prevention 
of the conflict from escalating.  A majority of the religious leaders articulated a shared 
sentiment that the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians currently is in a fragile 
state.  According to the respondents, there is a genuine concern that a small “spark” 
might be enough to cause the entire conflict to erupt into further violence and 
bloodshed.  If large-scale violence occurs, it becomes even the more difficult for 
political leaders and the international community to muster the political will and the 
resources needed for peacebuilding.  Thus, one goal of the religious leaders 
participating in track-II interreligious initiatives is to correct the misunderstandings 
and immediate tensions that could act as a catalyst to larger bloodshed. As one 
Christian respondent expressed, “Religion is a huge power here in the Middle East.  
Either we can build with it, or it will be a torrent or volcano that will destroy 
everything.”48 
 
For Salah Zuheika, a Muslim leader and Deputy Minister of the Islamic Waqf for the 
Palestinian Authority (PA), a key objective of his interreligious work concerns the 
correcting of misunderstandings between parties before they erupt into chaos.  When 
                                            
48 Khader, Personal interview. 
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describing his work with the CRIHL, Mr. Zuheika expressed a concern for the fragility 
of the current political conditions, and noted that religious leaders had a responsibility 
to respond to this fragility together.  As he observed: 
 
An important part of our interreligious work is to organize the relationships in this 
Holy place, this Holy City, especially in the sensitive areas.  Because with just a spark, 
everything will be in flames.  From time to time, we make a statement together or 
discuss certain problems.  We aim to delete the misunderstandings between us here 
before they get bigger. 49 
 
If the relationships between religious leaders are not organized in a way that works 
toward peace, the public can perceive misunderstandings with religious connotations 
incorrectly and destructively.  While Mr. Zuheika expressed that statements alone are 
not enough to completely avoid larger conflicts, they can contribute to a shared vision 
of peace.  
 
A number of Jewish leaders expressed a similar sentiment.  Oded Wiener, Director 
General of the Chief Rabbinate of Israel, highlighted the particular position religious 
leaders had in the societies as rationale for why leaders should aim to work together.  
For Wiener, religious leaders have “enormous powers” in that they can choose to 
contribute constructively or destructively to the conflict.  Thus, the assembly of 
religious leaders in the Holy Land plays a vital role in quenching potential eruptions of 
the societies as a whole.  “Our thoughts are, on both sides and especially amongst the 
religious leaders, is that the situation in the Middle East is quite fragile.  It is up to 
them [religious leaders] if they are going to put the area up into flames, or calm these 
flames down.”50  By coming together to discuss the issues that are prominent and 
contentious, religious leaders can adjust the course of imminent violence or 
misunderstandings building in the societies. 
 
                                            
49 Zuheika, Personal interview.  
50 Wiener, Personal interview.  
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Concretely, Rabbi Melchior described a current interreligious initiative that brings 
together religious leadership, namely Orthodox rabbis, settler rabbis, and Muslims 
within the Islamic movements, with the specific goal of reducing or extinguishing 
potential “sparks” between parties.  While the project is in its initial phase, Melchior 
expressed that such efforts are a necessity in the region.  His hope is that the inter-faith 
task force can eventually go into regular conflict areas -- particularly mixed towns and 
villages of both Israelis and Palestinians -- to stop a clash before it begins.  As he put 
it:  “There are always issues that pop up here.  We will have people who have big 
credibility go together, and they will try to avoid the conflicts before they blow up.”51  
The goal of such an interreligious initiative would be to focus on the narratives on 
both, but also the pains that the other is facing, to concretely halt violence and tension 
from breaking out.  
 
Two of the three Christian respondents also expressed an aim of avoiding imminent 
flare-ups when discussing their experiences in interreligious work.  For one, emphasis 
was placed on religious leaders’ moral influence as a force that could help to shift the 
conflict away from looming violence:  “Religious leaders have a lot of moral influence 
here.  Either we ignite the conflict, or we work together for justice and peace.”52  The 
other placed greater emphasis on current fear and mistrust between parties and the 
responsibility that religious leaders have to respond to this:  “People are threatened by 
what is going on - there is mistrust and separation between communities.  Whenever 
there is a political announcement in the news, this flies quickly… extremism becomes 
the answer in both the Muslim and Jewish communities.”53  Interreligious initiatives 
can therefore aim to treat the mutual misunderstandings between populations that often 
trigger extremist action. 
 
                                            
51 Zuheika, Personal interview.  
52 Khader, Personal interview. 
53 Rev. Canon Hosam Naoum, Personal interview, Jerusalem, February 2011. 
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Overall, these thematic responses suggest a goal that is not commonly cited by 
scholars of track-II diplomacy, and represents an interesting point of divergence from 
many other forms of track-II diplomacy.  For respondents to this study, the goal of 
interreligious track-II diplomacy can be understood as a way of preventing the 
grassroots from contributing to further deterioration of the conflict.  This also indicates 
that religious actors in the region view themselves as being in a particular position to 
affect change on a horizontal level (a discussion further developed in section 5.1). 
 
4.4.4 Instigating Immediate Changes to the Political Situation 
 
A fourth thematic goal that emerged, and one that was indisputably strongest amongst 
the Palestinian Muslim respondents, dealt with the goal of immediately altering 
political conditions in the region.  Whereas every religious leader articulated political 
and individual needs that were of pressing concern for the parties, several leaders 
repeated that such needs must be fulfilled hastily rather than over a long period of 
time.  
 
Unquestionably, Muslim religious leaders provided the most responses on this theme.  
For Sheikh Dr. Ekrima Sa’eed Sabri, former Grand Mufti of Jerusalem54 and Orator of 
the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the only goal of interreligious initiatives today should be to alter 
the current political situation for those living in the region.  Reflecting on a previous 
experience with Muslim, Christian, and Jewish leaders, he expressed frustration that 
interreligious initiatives in the region are often used “as a lie to signify that everything 
is alright here.”55  The rights for the people did not increase, and the situation instead 
deteriorated further.  For this reason, Sheikh Sabri has halted his participation in 
interreligious initiatives, expressing that there is no point in meeting with Jewish 
leaders in the region unless the goal is to specifically “increase the rights and justice 
for the people.”  Another Muslim leader in Ramallah shared this sentiment.  Reflecting 
                                            
54 The Grand Mufti is a Sunni Muslim cleric who is in charge of Islamic holy places in Jerusalem, most notably 
the Dome of the Rock and the Al-Aqsa Mosque.  
55 Sheikh Dr. Ekrima Sa’eed Sabri, Personal interview, Jerusalem, February 2011. 
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on an experience meeting with rabbis involved in the Neturei Karta movement,56the 
Sheikh noted that interreligious initiatives must aim directly to address the Israeli 
occupation of the Palestinian territories to “alleviate the suffering of the people.”  If 
the aim of the initiative does not specifically do this, then there is “very little to talk 
about.”57   
 
Similarly, Sheikh Mustfa al-Tawel, a Palestinian Shari'ah High Court Judge and signee 
of the Alexandria Declaration, argued that Muslim religious leaders have a particular 
responsibility to speak out against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza 
during interreligious initiatives: 
 
Our object [in interreligious initiatives] is to end the occupation, and have a free 
Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as the capitol.  Our message to the people, as 
religious leaders, is to live in freedom.  No one tells them what to do.  They should 
live in freedom with justice for all.58 
 
The Sheikh continued by reflecting on the story Caliph Omar Ibn al-Khattab, a 6th 
century Muslim leader in Jerusalem who refused to pray in the Church of the Holy 
Sepulchre as it would set a precedent that would lead to the Christian building's 
transformation into a mosque.  The Caliph declared that there must be freedom of 
religion, and freedom for all, in Jerusalem. Using this illustration as an example, 
Sheikh al-Tawel argued that a goal of interreligious work should be to allow for all 
three religious groups to live in peace and security, regardless of their religion, as “has 
been done historically.”59 
 
                                            
56 The Neturei Karta movement is an ultra-Orthodox Jewish group that opposes Zionism due to the belief that 
Jews are forbidden to have their own state until the coming of the Messiah. See Jiryis (1978, 67) for further 
discussion. 
57 Personal interview, Ramallah, February 2011. 
58 Sheikh Mostfa al-Tawel, Personal interview, Ramallah, February 2011. 
59 Sheikh al-Tawel’s reference to previous historical periods of peace between religious groups in the Middle 
East represents a sentiment shared by a large number of respondents from all three religious communities.  For 
many religious leaders, there was once a period in which all religious were able to live and be together.  The 
imagery of such a “golden age” serves as a reference point for the work of peacebuilding.  
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Rabbi Milgrom reflected on a number of meetings he had had with religious 
leadership, verifying many of the concerns raised by Palestinians.  In particular, he 
pointed out that the goal of the interreligious initiative changes when the two parties 
are not coming from equal power backgrounds.  He described the challenges of 
pursuing alternative goals by using the imagery of two interreligious participants 
taking, but one of the participant’s feet being crushed by a chair: 
 
Imagine that I am Palestinian and you are Israeli in the inter-faith encounter.  We are 
sitting opposite each other. You say to me, ‘Well, I want to hear about your traditions. 
Christmas or Ramadan and all that.’  And I say, ‘Well, yeah but – excuse me, but your 
chair is on my toe.’  And you, as an Israeli, say, ‘No, but – tell me about the fasts in 
Ramadan and Eid al-Fitr and all that.’ And I say, ‘I can’t because your chair is on my 
toe and it’s killing me!’  And then you finally respond, ‘But we didn’t come here to 
talk about that.  We came to talk about traditions and liturgy and all that.”  The 
problem is - how can you ignore the situation, the oppression, there?  Everything that 
is going on?  We are not meeting as equals.60 
 
To Rabbi Milgrom, any other goals of interreligious work become quite challenging 
and limited if they do not address the immediate political issues facing the participants.   
 
The immediate goal of altering the current political situation was not unique to, nor 
exclusively expressed by, Palestinians. Mr. Wiener articulated that interreligious 
initiatives must address immediate violence that takes place against civilians:  “No 
matter who is conducting the dialogue, I think that our first is goal is to condemn any 
terrorism in the name of God or in the name of religion.  There is no doubt about it.”61  
Mr. Wiener noted that addressing the use of religion for violence against innocent 
people must be priority for all inter-faith projects.  From his vantage point, it becomes 
nearly impossible to keep moving to peace if such events occur.  Rabbi David Rosen, 
Honorary Advisor to the Chief Rabbinate of Israel on Interreligious Affairs, also 
articulated the goal of immediate protection for the Jewish people in the region: 
 
Here [in the Holy Land], the interreligious dimension has an existential urgency about 
it that relates to the very survival of Israel itself.  If we are not able to integrate as part 
                                            
60 Milgrom, Personal interview. 
61 Wiener, Personal interview.  
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of the broader context in which we live here, then our future is going to look rather 
bleak.  This environment is overwhelmingly determined by its Islamic identity.  
Therefore, there needs to be a dialogue between the core Jewish identity of the polity 
that we call Israel and the identities of the others around us. The need for this 
encounter is important in terms of building the fabric for our well being here.62 
 
One ultimate aim of the interreligious initiative, then, must directly relate to securing 
the safety and well being of those living in the region.   
 
While the goal of instigating immediate changes in the political situation is not 
necessarily inconsistent with the aims of track-II diplomacy, most track-II scholars 
would argue that this might be fairly ambitious.  Track-II diplomacy seeks to 
supplement rather than replace track-I efforts, meaning that the formal government 
decision making processes still must decide to change current policies.  With the 
exception of the goal that track-II channels might link to the larger socio-political 
systems, responses in this category tended to indicate one of the largest limits of track-
II diplomacy; namely that the initiatives exist in the same environment as the 
conditions around it.  As Jabri (1995) argued, there is no way to isolate or remove the 
activities from the larger political and social conditions present in the system.  They 
will thus be influenced by the social continuities around them, as well as the absence 
of a track-I effort.  In the case of the Holy Land, several Palestinian Muslims and 
Christians articulated a sense of frustration that the initiatives did not do enough to 
address the current political environment, an issue that is further developed later in 
section 5.5.   
 
                                            
62 Rabbi David Rosen, Personal interview, Jerusalem, January 2011. 
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5. Opportunities and Obstacles for 
Interreligious Track-II Diplomacy 
 
One of the most challenging questions of a viable track-II diplomatic channel is the 
question of linkage back to the track-I processes. Since track-II diplomacy aims to 
supplement, rather than replace traditional diplomacy, the transfer of the contributions 
of track-II back to the more formal processes is of utmost importance.  As Fisher 
(2006, 69-70) illustrates, “Changes in attitudes (e.g. more differentiated and accurate 
images) and orientations (e.g. increased trust) have to result in a perceptual shift that 
supports the decision to enter negotiations.”  Realizations, strategies, and options that 
may have been developed in track-II channels must somehow be transferred to policy 
makers in order to drive the negotiation processes and other official interactions.    
 
While track-II diplomacy aims to link back to formal processes, practitioners 
themselves differ to how this should be done or how to measure ‘success’.  As Lennon 
(2007, 3) notes, success in track-II diplomacy does not necessarily mean “immediate 
policy impact” but instead can mean “enhancing the analytical capacity of 
participants” through open analysis and diplomacy.  Kraft (2006, 8) echoes this claim, 
arguing that “track-II meetings have an impact that cannot be measured in terms of 
material results, such as a policy, an agreement, or treaty.”  The impact, instead, is 
generally in the realm of language and ideas. For this reason, the identification a 
concise timeline and means for how track-II diplomacy ‘successfully’ links to track-I 
channels remains one of its dominant limitations. 
 
The aim of this chapter, then, is to fulfill the second research objective, namely to 
identify chief possibilities and obstacles toward a viable interreligious track-II channel, 
by bringing forward a number of themes that emerged from the interviews.  Since this 
paper does not aim to test whether or not interreligious track-II initiatives are actually 
capable of linking to formal track-I efforts, I will instead identify the perceived 
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possibilities and barriers for the viability of activities (i.e. the ability to grow, expand, 
or develop toward linking with formal channels of diplomacy).  
 
This chapter begins with an account of perceptions related to impact on the horizontal 
(grassroots) and the vertical (political powers) levels of the conflict (5.1).  In 
particular, I find that religious leaders in the Holy Land predominantly view 
themselves as being subordinate to the political processes and much more able to 
instigate change on the grassroots level.  Next, I provide an account of the perceived 
range of discussion topics (5.2), finding that a majority of religious leader believe that 
the scope of topics in interreligious track-II diplomacy either is a.) already restricted, 
or b.) should be restricted. The chapter then moves to two sections related to the 
question of participants in interreligious track-II efforts.  First, I offer an account of 
the apparent tension between the “right” and “wrong” participants in interreligious 
track-II efforts in the area (5.3). Second, I offer an account on the utilization of 
representatives of religious institutions in the efforts (5.4), acknowledging that such 
actors potentially have the best opportunity to permeate both the formal political 
structures and the grassroots masses but that they tend to experience the same 
structural constraints of formal track-I diplomacy.  Finally, I include an account of the 
concerns related to the timing of the initiatives (5.5).   The analysis in this chapter is 
presented by the main findings, followed by their implications, in order to highlight 
their practical and theoretical significance.    
 
5.1 Perception of Horizontal Impact as the Dominant Role 
 
While track-II diplomacy assumes that participants will have an impact on both the 
horizontal and vertical levels within a conflict, respondents to this study 
overwhelmingly viewed their role in peacebuilding as one most fit to influence the 
grassroots masses rather than influencing formal political channels.   
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5.1.1 Perceived Lack of Vertical Influence 
 
In nearly every interview, across every religious demographic, respondents articulated 
a sense of powerlessness in affecting the dominant political processes.  In some cases, 
participants even went so far to articulate that their role is “overwhelmingly 
subordinate”63 to the political authorities, expressing that there is very little they can 
do to influence the opinions of political leadership.   
 
Several religious leaders referenced the politicians currently in office, expressing 
doubt that the interreligious track-II initiatives would be able to penetrate the political 
thinking represented in the Israeli government and the PA.  For Rev. Canon Hosam 
Naoum, a Palestinian Christian and Assistant to the Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem, the 
strong, non-negotiable positions expressed by the political leaders frame the extent that 
track-II participants believe politicians will accept their ideas.  “People don’t trust that 
something good can come out of dialogues because the positions [of the government] 
are pre-determined.  Nothing will happen, and people get discouraged.”64  Rabbi Levi 
Weiman-Kelman, head rabbi of Kehilat Kol HaNeshama, noted that the current Israeli 
government would be too rigid to accept any ideas coming from religious leaders.  “I 
am sorry to say this,” he began, “but the Israeli government today would certainly not 
be very open to suggestions from religious leaders….I don’t imagine we could have 
much of an impact there.”65  Sheikh Dr. Ekrima Sabri, a Palestinian Muslim, agreed 
with this assertion, noting that “there is no relationship between the political 
governmental leaders and the religious leaders – the government does not take any 
ideas from religious leaders right now.”66   
 
For Rabbi David Rosen, ideas generated in interreligious efforts may not be able to 
pass through the dominant political processes.  Not only are many religious positions 
                                            
63 Rosen, Personal interview. 
64 Naoum, Personal interview. 
65 Weiman-Kelman, Personal interview. 
66 Sabri, Personal interview. 
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appointed by political actors, religious leaders’ are not in a position to challenge the 
politicians and their work.  He notes: 
 
In the end, [religious leaders in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories] are 
subject to the political authority and in some cases are subjugated to their political 
powers.  To expect religion here to have a prophetic role, to speak truth to power or to 
essentially challenge the political structures, one will be disappointed.  This is not the 
capacity of the institutional structures of religion here, to challenge.67   
 
For this reason, religious leaders won’t necessarily play a “very critical role in actually 
bringing peace because they do not permeate the political structures.”   
 
5.1.2 Perceived Position of Horizontal Influence 
 
While religious leaders generally agreed that they are limited in their vertical 
influence, they were quick to point out they may have a different role in peacebuilding.  
Rabbi Rosen, for instance, expressed that inability to challenge the political structures 
does not make religious leaders irrelevant to peace-related work. To Rabbi Rosen, 
religious leaders essentially serve as the symbolic representations of the fundamental 
identities of the parties involved. In sum, their impact could be realized by working 
with the grassroots masses in support for peace. 
 
Respondents more often than not articulated that religious leaders have a unique 
potential to impact and influence their constituencies.  Many stated that the role of 
religious leaders is to serve as an ethical and moral example to the grassroots 
communities, showing that they can act differently from discourses of continued 
violence coming from politicians and religious leaders alike.  Others noted that they 
could provide religious values that encourage peacebuilding behavior to others.  
Patriarch Michel Sabah, for example, expressed that religious leaders’ unique position 
as spiritual leaders in the society may be best suited for the horizontal level of the 
                                            
67 Rosen, Personal interview. 
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conflict.  While religious leaders may not be in a position to speak against the political 
authorities, they instead  “should be giving the values that frame political behavior” of 
their religious constituents.68  Dr. Ron Kronish of the ICCI agreed with this claim, 
noting that “The Rabbis, Imams, Pastors should be teaching our people what peace 
means in the schools, the mosques, and synagogues…What peace means in our 
traditions, and how we approach the other.”69   
 
Nowhere was it more evident that religious leaders perceive themselves as being in a 
position able to affect the horizontal levels than in the responses on the goals of 
interreligious track-II initiatives.  With the exception of responses dealing with 
instigating immediate change (4.4.4), all other responses highlighted a perception that 
religious leaders are in a position to influence change on the grassroots level.  For 
those who described interreligious track-II diplomacy as a means to shift destructive 
narratives toward supporting peace and reconciliation (4.4.2), the key unit of analysis 
was the larger civil society rather than political actors.  As Father Jamal Khader, a 
Palestinian priest, put it, “Israelis and Palestinians are not used to hearing their 
religious leaders talking in the language [of peace].”  Religious leaders understood 
themselves as being watched and listened to by the masses.  The same can be said for 
responses related to preventing a spark between parties that could ignite the conflict 
further (4.4.3).  Many religious leaders viewed themselves as being in a position to 
slow down the conflict’s momentum and, if necessary, to pacify the masses.  Using 
language such as “enormous power”70 and “big credibility”71 to describe their position 
within grassroots movements, many religious leaders clearly perceived their ability to 
support a peace process on the horizontal level as a central characteristic of their role 
as religious leaders. 
 
 
                                            
68 Sabah, Personal interview.  
69 Kronish, Personal interview. 
70 Wiener, Personal interview. 
71 Melchior, Personal interview.  
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5.1.3 Implications 
 
The data suggests a surprising paradox:  religious leaders in the region perceive 
themselves as having no power on a vertical level, but significant power horizontally. 
This presents a number of opportunities and challenges.  
 
First, one of the most limiting obstacles is that religious leaders may avoid passing 
new ideas to political leaders if they feel that the efforts of interreligious track-II 
diplomacy will be unable to permeate official channels of diplomacy.  Thus, track-II 
efforts will only operate with the hope that they can spread horizontally and avoid 
putting pressure on politicians for official, track-I peace processes. Second, a 
perception that interreligious track-II initiatives’ work is unable to permeate official 
political channels could limit the range of themes that are discussed in an interreligious 
track-II initiative.  If religious leaders do not believe that the dialogues will lead to 
specific changes, they may avoid discussing topics on issues they feel that it will have 
little to contribute (see the next section, 5.2, for further discussion).   
 
The perception that interreligious track-II processes may not permeate the formal 
government channels seems to affirm a limitation of track-II diplomacy identified by 
Richmond (2001).  Richmond argues that track-II processes can only operate under the 
approval of track-I processes or official actors. He argues that in situations where 
track-I negotiations are not simultaneously occurring, track-II approaches “become 
slaves to state interests, with all of their inherent legal and structural asymmetries; they 
may reinforce stereotyping and nationalism; and make actors more aware of the 
structure and political oppression they face in the current context” (2001, 18).  For this 
reason, interreligious track-II diplomacy may not be able to operate at its full potential 
without both governments providing explicit or implicit indications that they will 
consider the ideas that are generated. 
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A possible opportunity, however, rests in the respondents’ perception that they can 
indeed be agents for change within the grassroots populations. While many feel 
limited on a vertical level, they understand themselves as being able to pass ideas to 
their constituents and support peace.  More attention and resources ought to be focused 
on how to best transfer the ideas developed in interreligious track-II initiatives to the 
respective grassroots religious communities.    
 
5.2 Constraints on Topics for Discussion 
  
While I have established that interreligious track-II diplomacy involves addressing the 
overall political relationship of the parties, respondents to this study do not perceive 
that track-II initiatives between Israelis and Palestinians are completely open for all 
topics of discussion.  A vast majority of respondents articulated either a perception that 
a.) the range of discussion topics should be limited, or b.) the range of discussion 
topics is already limited.   
 
5.2.1 Range of Topics Should Be Limited 
 
A common theme that emerged, primarily by Jewish participants, pertained to the 
limits of what could practically be discussed in their role as religious leaders.  A 
distinction was frequently drawn between the responsibilities held by religious leaders 
and those that are held by political leaders.  Particularly, some respondents articulated 
that religious leaders might not have the right academic training necessary to discuss 
more policy-related topics since their training is as spiritual leaders. Dr. Kronish, for 
example, articulated his reservations about discussing issues that are too policy-
focused.  Based on his training as a rabbi, he would not feel comfortable discussing 
and making decisions on specific details of a peace agreement: 
 
I jokingly divide the world between the lawyers and the rabbis – or the religious 
leaders in general.  I didn’t learn in rabbinical school how to write a contract, so don’t 
send me to negotiations where I have to negotiate and come up with some peace treaty 
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between parties.  I know nothing about it.  I did learn how to give a sermon, and how 
to teach a text and tell a story.  I can do that – that is what we were trained to do.72 
 
In his opinion, more policy-related discussion may not be appropriate topics to discuss 
during interreligious track-II initiatives since they demand expertise from other 
academic backgrounds as his own. “I am not a political scientist, I am not a lawyer,” 
he expressed frankly.   
 
Three other Jewish religious leaders spoke in more detail about what topics do not 
specifically fall under their responsibility, ability, or jurisdiction.  Oded Wiener, 
Director General of the Chief Rabbinate of Israel, expressed discontentment with the 
assumption that religious leaders should discuss specifics of a final status agreement 
between Israelis and Palestinians, articulating that a religious leader’s responsibility is 
not to make decisions on such matters.  As he put it, “We don’t necessarily need to 
speak about the peace and the borders, it is not up for us to decide anyway.  It is the 
politicians’ duty.”73 Thus, topics in interreligious track-II diplomacy should instead 
focus on giving moral support to ideas which politicians are already exploring since 
“that is what the politicians were elected to do.”  Religious leaders should instead draw 
their attention to common political challenges facing both parties, namely topics 
related to access to medicine and technology, and more moral issues such as behavior 
of young generations or divorce rates.  By reaching a common vision for how to 
address such issues, Mr. Wiener felt that both parties could find a way forward 
together.   
 
Jewish respondents were not the only group to articulate that certain issues were not fit 
to talk about in interreligious track-II initiatives, however.  One Palestinian Christian 
noted that religious leaders should not try to “make politics” by political planning in 
inter-religious meetings.  They consequently “don’t talk about what the solution 
should be: ‘two states with those borders, etc. etc.’” since “that is up to the politicians 
                                            
72 Kronish, Personal interview.   
73 Wiener, Personal interview.  
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to decide.”  Additionally, as discussed in section 4.4.4, several Muslim leaders 
articulated their limits for what should or should not be discussed when discussing 
their goals of the initiatives.  Instead of stating that some topics were too politicized to 
discuss, they argued that the only topics worth discussing at all were those specifically 
aimed to increase the rights and justice for the Palestinian people.  If the aim of the 
initiative does not specifically do this, then there is “very little to talk about.”  As a 
result, the range of discussions on the table is not completely open since discussions 
must meet certain pre-established characteristics in order for them to be considered. 
 
5.2.2 Range of Topics Already Limited 
 
A number of divergent concerns arose from those who perceived the range of topics as 
already limited.  A majority of Christians and Muslims, for example, felt that Jewish 
leaders were intentionally avoiding discussions of critical importance for Palestinians. 
Instead of discussing issues related to rights, access, and policy -- daily struggles 
affecting the lives of Palestinians -- Jewish leaders would instead ‘pass the buck’ and 
say it was up to political leadership to decide. As Sheikh Mostfa al-Tawel of the 
Shari’ah Supreme Judicial Council expressed, “We [Palestinian religious leaders] are 
ready to discuss topics related to giving Palestinians their rights.  The Israeli [religious 
leaders] keep trying to run away from it.”7475 
 
Sheikh al-Tawel was not the only one who felt that many Jewish leaders were not 
willing to discuss more policy-related topics.  A number of other Palestinian Muslims 
and Christians also indicated a perception that Jewish participants were avoiding 
certain areas of discussion by stating that they were ‘security issues’. Salah Zuheika of 
the Palestinian Ministry of the Al-Waqf, for example, expressed frustration with the 
avoidance of topics related to policy on holy sites by many Jewish leaders.  As he 
expressed it, “We [Palestinian religious leaders] have to try and try and try and try 
                                            
74 al-Tawel, Personal interview.  
75 al-Tawel, Personal interview.  
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until the Jewish leaders are open to certain discussions.”76  When discussing access 
and respect for holy sites such as the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Church of the Holy 
Sepulchre, Mr. Zuheika voiced concern that such topics are avoided by Jewish leaders 
as soon as the term ‘security risk’ is uttered:  “The Israelis, they put everything in 
security matters and that’s it - end of discussion.  And this is a problem.”  Thus, 
according to Mr. Zuheika, certain topics are off the table for discussion when Israelis 
perceive them as a security issue.   
 
While Palestinian Christians and Muslims undoubtedly expressed a stronger sentiment 
that certain topics could be removed from the table if they were perceived as having 
implications on security, one Israeli Jewish participant articulated frustration with 
many of his fellow Israelis for avoiding issues since they are always “on guard for 
anti-Semitism”.  When discussing his concerns with many interreligious initiatives 
between Israelis and Palestinians, Rabbi Jeremy Milgrom voiced that many of his 
Jewish colleagues are unwilling to discuss certain topics because they remain “pre-
occupied with the history of anti-Semitism.”  As he puts it: 
 
We have set up inter-faith dialogues as a place where we [as Jews] are not answerable 
to the things we do.  Marc Ellis has expressed this before, that Jews and Christians will 
come together so long as Jews are not responsible for the injustice of the Occupation 
and how Palestinians are treated.77  ‘We will talk to you, but you can’t bring up the 
conflict.’  We talk about the past, the history of Christian anti-Semitism.  But we are 
not answerable for the privilege we have taken or the suffering we are causing.78   
 
Rabbi Milgrom noted that such an attitude was a “big challenge,” and that it allowed 
parties to “continue to do whatever we want to do, whatever we can get away with.”  
Without addressing the challenge, it would be difficult to allow for equal partners in an 
interreligious setting. 
 
                                            
76 Zuheika, Personal interview.  
77 Marc E. Ellis is a University Professor of Jewish Studies and Director of the Center for Jewish Studies at 
Baylor University in the United States.  For more information on his work on modern Judaism in the Israeli-
Palestinian context, see Ellis (2002).   
78 Milgrom, Personal interview.  
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When reflecting on some of the challenges facing interreligious track-II diplomacy, 
Mr. Wiener noted that many Palestinian religious leaders might not understand the 
difference between a religious and a political issue when meeting with Israeli religious 
leaders.  They may have instead misinterpreted the range that can feasibly be discussed 
in an inter-religious setting, and the extent by which Jewish leaders can act. As he 
described: 
 
The biggest obstacle we have in our conversations, especially for Palestinians – no 
matter if they are Christian or Muslims – is that they are not always aware, or they 
perceive that there is a very thin line between religious leaders and political leaders.  
Many, many times they try to bring up questions of occupation, and territories in our 
conversations even though we are not the right people to address for that.  They can’t 
make the distinction between religious issues and political issues.79 
 
Mr. Wiener believed that there were more appropriate channels for addressing issues 
related to policy of the Israeli government, and that inter-religious initiatives should 
therefore focus on religious issues rather than political issues.  
 
5.2.3 Implications 
 
The dominating perception that the range of discussion topics is quite narrow, a view 
articulated by all three religious groups, suggests a number of considerable limitations 
concerning the transfer of new ideas into track-I channels.   First, several Jewish 
leaders and one Christian shared the perception that religious leaders have entirely 
different roles than political leaders.  According to some respondents, religious leaders 
lack the formal legal and political training often necessary for policy making. They 
should therefore not be expected to discuss or come to a conclusion on such topics, 
especially if their ideas will not permeate formal political structures (see section 5.1.1).  
In the words of Dr. Kronish, “don’t send me to negotiations where I have to negotiate 
and come up with some peace treaty between parties.  I know nothing about it.”80  
                                            
79 Wiener, Personal interview. 
80 Kronish, Personal interview. 
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If this sentiment is interpreted as an honest self-appraisal of the roles and limitations of 
religious leaders rather than ‘passing the buck,’ the possibility for the initiatives to 
serve as a mechanism for the development of policy advice to the governments -- a 
concept argued by Ball et al. (2006) -- appears less viable.  This is especially 
problematic for religiously charged, politically coupled issues such as holy sites.  
While a majority of respondents articulated that religious leaders will have a role in 
future agreements related to access to holy sites, they never-the-less argue that it is not 
within their range of academic and spiritual training to set policy on it.  
 
The perception that certain discussion should be left off the table suggests another 
possible limitation of interreligious track-II diplomacy:  instead of serving as a channel 
to address issues neglected by track-I diplomacy, interreligious track-II diplomacy 
may instead reinforce conflict dynamics by avoiding salient concerns of the parties.   
More concretely, if one party continually determines what issues should be considered 
relevant and what are not, this could reinforce many of the power dynamics already 
present between Israelis and Palestinians.  Certain participants may feel that their 
needs are ignored in both formal and informal channels, contributing to the belief that 
there are no partners left to address salient concerns.  Abu-Nimer warns of such a 
reinforcing dynamic, nothing that an imbalance of power in the dialogue room can 
severely undermine the effectiveness of an interfaith dialogue process (2002, 21). 
    
One area of unique possibility, however, relates to the apparent divergent definitions 
of what actually constitutes the “overall political relationship of the parties”. As 
discussed previously in Chapter 4, it was quite clear from the interviews that the 
coupling of religion and politics, a term utilized by Breger et al. (2010), was a definite 
feature of the conflict dynamics. When religious leaders entered into an interreligious 
track-II effort, many of them spoke from different experiences of what was political, 
what was religious, and what religious leaders should discuss altogether. Each 
participant arrived with a different interpretation, and a seemingly different conceptual 
language, of what should or should not be considered as a religious issue for 
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discussion. While some respondents believed that political relationship between parties 
implied policies set by governments, other respondents believed this implied questions 
of spirituality or morality.   
 
Tension between what is religious and what is political, especially when it comes to 
sensitive issues such as Jerusalem and holy sites, is also a characteristic of the larger 
conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.  Consequently, interreligious track-II 
diplomacy could serve as a mechanism for untangling the nuances for what issues 
between parties can be considered religious, what issues are political, or what issues 
are combinations of the two.  A deeper understanding of where the two meet, and 
where the two concepts are entirely different, could serve a valuable role in future 
policy-making.    
 
5.3 The Conundrum of “Right” and “Wrong” Participants 
 
For many track-II diplomacy scholars, the participants involved in track-II initiatives 
can be of critical importance for the effectiveness and transfer of ideas into formal 
channels. As discussed in section 2.2.2, track-II participants share a number of ideal 
characteristics that “make a vital difference in facilitating or compromising the success 
of a [track-II] exercise” (Agha et al. 2003, 176). While this study does not test whether 
the respondents surveyed fulfill each and every one of these ideal characteristics, it did 
reveal that religious leaders in the Holy Land perceived involvement by certain 
participants as playing a big role in the success of the effort.  In particular, respondents 
articulated a perceived tension concerning a.) the inclusion of solely the ‘right’ 
participants (moderates who share a common vision for communication) if they do not 
have the necessary horizontal/vertical influence, and b.) the exclusion of the ‘wrong’ 
participants (hard-lined voices who may not be willing to cooperate) if they may be 
better positioned to make an impact.  
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5.3.1 “Preaching to the Converts” 
 
One commonly cited concern voiced by Christian and Jewish respondents pertained to 
the utilization of participants who are willing to talk (the ‘right’ participants) but may 
not represent the views or demographics of the wider populations.  In particular, 
respondents raised the concern that a majority of the interreligious initiatives in the 
region utilize the same like-minded participants every time.  When reflecting on his 
experiences, Father Khader discussed his perceptions that the only people who attend 
interreligious initiatives are those that either already believe in its value or are 
employed to be there.  From his perspective, such initiatives can only do so much to 
support larger peace processes since the initiatives are “preaching to the converts” – or 
those people who already have decided that the meeting has value.  Moreover, such 
participants may not represent the larger views of the populations:  
 
My perception is that we are preaching to the converts – those that already believe in 
the process.  We have dialogue with people who are professional in dialogue, for 
example.  They are able to live because of dialogue.  They have their own NGOs for 
promoting such efforts.  The important question, however, is how to reach for those 
who do not believe in dialogue, or who do not care. Usually, the majority is not 
interested.  They minority is more interested in dialogue.81  
 
Khader expressed concern that the impact of the initiative on the wider population will 
be limited if only a small number of the same people are involved every time.   
 
Rabbi Weiman-Kelman articulated a similar concern, describing a “high level of 
frustration” with trying to find new participants to interreligious initiatives.  While 
discussing his 30 years of experience in interreligious work, he acknowledged that one 
major challenge is the recruitment of new participants who do not already believe in 
the value of the meeting.  While the current participants were admittedly “good 
people,” he expressed that “you pretty much always know who is going to show up at 
                                            
81 Khader, Personal interview. 
 
 
 
 
73 
these things.”82  If the same like-minded people attend every time, the likelihood that 
new ideas can be generated and transferred becomes reduced.  As Rabbi Weiman-
Kelman put it, “it’s an unrealistic expectation that the same people [meeting every 
time] will have new ideas.”  The task then is to recruit people who might represent the 
voices of the larger population rather than the limited few who already want to be 
together.   
 
While discussing his role on the CRIHL, Mr. Wiener also acknowledged the challenge 
of coming up with new ideas when the pool of participants is limited.  Mr. Wiener 
acknowledged that “each of us [religious leaders] already have our own opinions, 
fixed opinions, that we won’t change too much.”83  According to Mr. Wiener, those 
who are involved have already decided that they want to be there.  Thus, even more 
attention must be placed to expanding the pool of participants beyond those who are 
already in the system.  This can be done currently, and especially with focus on the 
next generation.  
 
5.3.2 The Absence of Certain Parties 
 
Reversely, some respondents discussed the implications of excluding the ‘wrong’ 
participants who might actually be in a better position to influence the vertical and 
horizontal levels of the conflict. When describing a series of Swiss and Norwegian-
sponsored interreligious initiatives that took place in the 1990s and early 2000s, Rabbi 
Michael Melchior articulated concern with solely utilizing like-minded participations.  
According to Rabbi Melchior, the Palestinian and Israeli participants in interreligious 
efforts embodied the minority of the populations at the time (“the very left of the 
Israelis and the very left of the Palestinians”84).  They were already committed to 
peacebuilding efforts.  If such initiatives hoped to link back to the larger peace efforts, 
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Rabbi Melchior argued that more attention must be placed on those groups who are 
skeptical or against the peacebuilding efforts.  In particular, more attention must be 
given to those groups that may see peace against their religious legitimization: 
 
Having a serious dialogue with the ultimate leadership of the Islamic movements – 
including the political parties like the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and Jihad – 
together with parts of the Israeli religious leadership, to see if it is possible to create a 
religious peace between the religious which will give the legitimization for political 
peace.  I think this is crucial.85 
 
Thus, for Rabbi Melchior, greater attention should be placed on the parties that 
traditionally are not involved in interreligious initiatives if it is to have an impact on 
the larger track-I processes.  
 
While two other Jewish leaders, one Christian leader, and one Muslim leader shared a 
similar sentiment, not all of the respondents felt that the absence of certain parties was 
a negative thing.  Patriarch Sabah, for example, argued that the priority of 
interreligious initiatives should be to include parties willing to cooperate.  The 
presence of hard-line parties might limit the extent to what could be discussed.  The 
presence of parties that are perceived as extremists could also be perceived as 
superficial: 
 
There are people who don’t want to dialogue. So far, their positions are not for 
dialogue.  They don’t want to meet.  Hamas will not meet with the Settlers.  The 
Settlers will not meet with Hamas.  The thing is, so far with more moderate people – 
we do not make so much process.  To speak with less moderate people, we will make 
less progress.  It will be just a show.  To have a show - a dialogue just to say we meet 
– it is useless.  It is cheating the public opinion.  You are making it up! 86 
 
According to Patriarch Sabah, the presence of such parties or individuals would give 
an erroneous outward appearance that all parties can work together when this may not 
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be the case.  Therefore, the absence of such parties may be more conducive to progress 
in the initiatives. 
 
5.3.3 Implications 
 
The tension between having the ‘right’ participants who are willing to meet and share 
in problem-solving activities, and the recognition that they might not have the 
adequate connections to the vertical and horizontal levels of the conflict as more hard-
line, ‘wrong’ candidates, is one commonly cited limitation of track-II diplomacy. In 
her study of security-related track-II efforts in the Middle East and South Asia, Kaye 
(2005) found that the tension between the “right and wrong” participants is common 
on an elite level.  According to Kaye (2005, 25), “two common problems emerge at 
the elite level: dialogues include the ‘wrong’ type of people or they include the ‘right’ 
type of people with limited influence on official policy and little legitimacy in their 
domestic environments.”  This conundrum is one of the largest limitations of track-II 
diplomacy as it can indeed play a major role in ability of new ideas to transfer both 
vertically and horizontally.  Kaye (2005, 26) writes that one of the never ending 
challenges of track-II dialogues is to “find a core group including the ‘right’ type of 
individuals who also have influence and represent a broad spectrum of constituencies 
back at home.”   
 
In the case of interreligious track-II initiatives between Israelis and Palestinians, the 
task of broadening the field to include new voices remains a challenge.  Parties like the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, the Israeli settler movement, and the Ultra-Orthodox 
Jewish communities represent large portions of Israeli and Palestinian societies87, but 
little evidence suggest that they participate in interreligious efforts.  Without further 
scrutiny on the impact that including (or excluding) such parties could have on the 
                                            
87 See Cincotta (2011) and Cohen (2005, 351) for further discussion. 
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generation, transfer, or acceptance of jointly developed ideas, a key puzzle still 
remains. 
 
5.4 Formal Track-I Dynamics with the Heads of Religious Institutions 
 
Another particularly prominent theme that emerged from respondents dealt with the 
perceived drawbacks and strengths of engaging the heads of religious institutions in 
various interreligious initiatives.  A religious institution can be described as an 
establishment, organization, or association initiated to advance or promote religious 
purposes or beliefs.  These institutions represent constituents greater than just a local 
congregation, synagogue, or mosque.  In Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories, 
leaders of several of the highest official religious authorities are involved in 
interreligious initiatives, and a few of such institutions are linked to either the State of 
Israel or the PA.88 Within this study, nearly half of the respondents represented a 
religious institution as its head, former head, or official representative to interreligious 
initiatives.89     
 
Advocates of engaging the heads of religious institutions generally support their 
involvement for two reasons.  First, the inclusion of religious institution heads ensures 
continuity and longevity of the initiative if religious leadership changes.  If one leader 
passes away or retires, another religious leader within the same religious background 
is able to replace them to ensure that the initiative continues.  This is the case with the 
CRIHL, which assembles the Chief Rabbis of Israel, the Catholic and Greek Patriarchs 
and Anglican and Lutheran Bishops of the Holy Land, the minister for religious affairs 
in the PA, and the Supreme Judge of the Shari’ah Court (Khan 2010). Second, the 
heads of the official religious institutions in the region have both the legal authority 
                                            
88 Two examples of religious institutions directly linked to the state or state-like structures are the Chief 
Rabbinate of Israel and the Ministry of the Al-Waqf and Religious Affairs for the PA. For further discussion on 
how such institutions relate to the state, see Neuberger (1997, 100-112) and Shteiwi (1997, 92-93). 
89 While all of the respondents who were the heads of the institutions participated in the CRIHL, their 
experiences in interreligious initiatives were not exclusively on this council.  
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over many of the most controversial holy sites while representing the spiritual 
authority of each party.  As one Jewish leader expressed, “[the institutional structures 
of religion] essentially are the symbolic representations of the fundamental identities 
of the parties involve.”90 Including such actors may provide the legal and spiritual 
support for decisions on religious elements of the conflict. 
 
Respondents, however, articulated a number of constraints when including actors 
affiliated with official religious institutions. Perceived challenges were not only 
brought up by respondents outside of the official religious institutions, but were also 
noted by respondents who currently serve as the head of a religious institution, have 
served in such capacity in the past, or have formally represented such institutions in 
various interreligious initiatives.  Particularly, two central themes emerged: a 
perceived lack of freedom from the religious institution itself and a perceived lack of 
distance from official government structures.   
 
5.4.1 Lack of Freedom from the Institution 
 
Respondents who raised concern that heads of religious institutions may have a lack of 
freedom from the institutions they represent described the almost “diplomatic” 
position each religious leader takes on behalf of their institution.  Rev. Canon Hosam 
Naoum, for example, described his experiences of formally representing the Anglican 
Communion in the Holy Land to several interreligious initiatives.  In particular, he 
noted that those who represent religious institutions must solely speak on behalf of the 
institution that they lead or represent.  In some ways, this becomes almost a 
“diplomatic” meeting rather than an unofficial, informal setting: 
 
Normally, in each and every entity – a diocese, or church, or mosque, etc. – there are 
certain people that are assigned to such interreligious forums or dialogues.  These 
people usually have very diplomatic conversations and speeches – they are people that 
                                            
90 Rosen, Personal interview. 
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know how to speak, like Dennis Ross91 or something. If the person can’t attend, 
someone else will be delegated to go in their place with the materials already 
prepared.92  
 
Rev. Naoum’s comparison of religious leaders to diplomats continued as he noted that 
religious leaders generally come prepared with their institution’s position, ready to 
contribute a pre-determined statement.  Each religious group and religious institution 
comes forward with its individual positions, which “doesn’t go as deep as one might 
like.”93  
 
Another religious leader who has formally represented a religious institution, Patriarch 
Sabah, argued that religious leaders who represent institutions take on similar attitudes 
to politicians.  Specifically, he argued that many religious leaders, like politicians, are 
more interested in remaining in their position of power rather than serving the people’s 
needs.  As he described, “Today, [religious leadership’s] biggest priority is to keep 
their seat, then serve.  The common good is in second place.  The first place is to keep 
their position of power.”94 Patriarch Sabah noted that such religious leaders will never 
act in a way to upset their institution or constituency – constraining the ability to speak 
on behalf of themselves.   
 
5.4.2 Lack of Distance from Government 
 
Perceptions that religious leaders may not exhibit a distance from formal government 
channels were even more widely cited and discussed by respondents.  Some expressed 
brief remarks about heads of institutions being “government employees”95 or 
“subordinate to their political auspices,”96 while others provided more details.  Dr. 
Kronish, for example, noted that he has chosen to work with more mid-range religious 
                                            
91 Dennis Ross is an American diplomat who has represented the U.S. in the Middle East under Presidents 
George W. Bush and Bill Clinton. 
92 Naoum, Personal interview.  
93 Naoum, Personal interview.   
94 Sabah,  Personal interview. 
95 Sabri, Personal interview. 
96 Muslim leader, Personal interview. 
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leaders since the heads of religious institutions “represent the vantage point of the state 
they represent.  They are not independent bodies - they are all tied in to political 
stuff.”97  Rabbi Jeremy Milgrom noted that the official religious leadership “rarely 
goes very far from what the official lines and policies of the government are.”98  He 
argued that their actions and statements are generally tepid since they are part of the 
religious establishment rather than prophetic religion.   
 
While discussing his own interreligious efforts, Rabbi Weiman-Kelman articulated his 
reservations with activities that mainly include representatives of official religious 
institutions.  In particular, he noted that religious leadership on an official level might 
not be able to take risks due to their connection to the government structures: 
 
[Religious institutional actors] are very politically beholden.  They all have political 
agendas.  I mean, I have one too –there is nothing wrong with having a political 
agenda.  But they have formal political agendas.  They belong to political parties and 
institutions that limit the range of interactions…Such political leaders are part of the 
general mindset of being stuck- they are not willing to take the risk that real leadership 
demands.  A lot of them have connections to political entities, and it becomes a deep 
pathology. 99  
 
To Rabbi Weiman-Kelman, religious leadership must be willing to “speak truth to 
power,” and those who head formal religious institutions may be constrained to do 
this.  Their positions instead become the position of their governments.   
 
Several religious leaders with experiences of representing a formal religious institution 
echoed these concerns.   Patriarch Sabah pointed out what he perceived to be a critical 
limitation of religious leaders representing institutions. To Patriarch Sabah, religious 
leaders must be “fair enough, wise enough, and courageous enough to say a word that 
is different from the political leaders,” yet many of them are unwilling or unable to do 
this due to their position.  As he put it, “The difficulty for the Muslim and Jewish 
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leaders and authorities are that they are part of the political authority. They were 
nominated in function by political authorities.  Hence, it is difficult for them to speak, 
even if they have religious and spiritual values that are opposite.”100 In his opinion, 
many of the leaders are unable to step away from the government stance due to their 
position. Mr. Zuheika echoed this sentiment.  He expressed his doubt that religious 
actors, Muslim, Christian or Jew, would speak beyond the position of their 
government, noting that it would be a move “against the interest of their country.”101 
 
Rev. Naoum described one interreligious initiative with Israeli and Palestinian 
religious leadership in the Arab village of Umm al-Fahm.  He vocalized a concern that 
religious leaders were unable to articulate their actual thoughts and beliefs due to their 
relationship(s) with the state.  He used the image of a formal government official to 
illustrate: 
 
If you talk to the religious leaders individually, you will hear a different speech from 
how they speak publically.  I think this is because they represent the government […] 
in these activities.  Like take any figure – President Obama, for example.  Maybe 
Obama has different views, but as president he has to do things the way he must do 
things.  It is the same for the Chief Rabbis and other positions - they are appointed by 
the government.  Even if they have their own views, they say what they are told to 
say.102   
 
Instead of having the flexibility to speak their own minds in an unofficial setting, Rev. 
Naoum expressed that many leaders were constrained by the state structures that their 
religious institution was related to.  
 
5.4.3 Implications 
 
The aforementioned concerns -- that heads of religious institutions may not have the 
necessary distance from the government’s position, nor the ability to speak in 
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opposition to their official institutional position -- indicates what could be two 
significant limitations to such interreligious initiatives serving as track-II diplomacy.  
First, the critiques bear striking resemblance to the same critiques offered by Saunders 
(1991) of official, track-I diplomacy.  As discussed in Chapter 2, formal negotiation 
channels exhibit a number of structural limitations.  Primarily, government officials 
are rarely able to speak separately from the government since their words will likely be 
perceived as the official government position (Saunders 1991, 51).  They will therefore 
not stray more than a limited distance from the point of the view of the government’s 
position and will likely not speak contrary to their own government.  Additionally, the 
participants who hold a title in the government generally must speak on behalf of the 
institution itself rather than their own position, and are unable to quickly change 
existing ways of thinking due to the institutional constraint.   
 
According to respondents in this study, strikingly similar structural constraints are 
present when the heads of religious institutions are involved in interreligious 
initiatives.  Leaders of religious institutions may not be able to stray very far from the 
official institutional position, and often appoint someone to speak their prepared 
position if they are unable to attend.  The meetings are very formal, and participants 
often assume a “diplomatic” role in that they are not able to speak openly and 
personally since it may be perceived as the official government or institutional 
position.  Moreover, respondents perceived heads of religious institutions as being 
limited by the governments that appointed many of them.  They are unwilling to speak 
against the position of their government since it may be perceived as compromising to 
the interests of each party.  In sum, the formal track-I processes may be indirectly 
projected into the track-II channel.  This potentially acts contrary to the stated 
purposes of track-II diplomacy as providing an informal setting where participants can 
discuss issues not addressed in more formal settings. There may not be enough 
distance from the government channels to allow for track-II diplomacy. 
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Secondly, and directly contradictory to the prospects of interreligious initiatives 
serving specifically as track-II diplomacy in the Holy Land, initiatives that include 
heads of official Jewish and Muslim religious institutions might not be characterized 
as track-II diplomacy at all.  Track-II diplomacy assumes that participants are non-
officials who do not serve a role in the government’s formal diplomatic structures.  
While the heads of the religious initiatives do not necessarily act in the formal 
diplomatic structures, many are employed by or appointed by the Israeli and 
Palestinians governments.  Although this does not necessarily imply that they are not 
free to speak their own opinions, it may limit participant’s abilities to operate freely 
and candidly in contrast to the official government or institutional positions.  A more 
accurate category of peacebuilding efforts might be “track one-and-a-half” diplomacy.  
Jones (2008a, 4) notes that track one-and-a-half diplomacy refers to “unofficial 
dialogues, during which all or most of the participants from the conflicting sides are 
officials, or non-officials acting under something approaching “instructions” from their 
respective governments.”  Further research is required to gauge if this characterization 
is accurate.     
 
5.5 The Question of Timing 
 
One final theme that emerged from the interviews, albeit the least prominent of all 
those highlighted in this thesis, concerned the question of the timing of interreligious 
track-II initiatives.  Specifically, several respondents made comments related to a.) the 
extent to which the current initiatives are occurring at the right time at all and/or b.) 
how long will it take to reach “success” in the efforts.  While responses related to this 
theme were certainly not in agreement, the frequency in which a majority of 
respondents discussed timing of the activities in some way warrants further 
investigation. 
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5.5.1 Should We Wait? 
 
For a few religious leaders, timing is a key component to consider in gauging whether 
or not an interreligious track-II initiative can transfer ideas to track-I efforts.  When 
discussing his views on the role of religious leaders in peacebuilding, one Muslim 
Sheikh emphasized that ideas generated in track-II efforts may be better received by 
politicians if the accompanied a formal track-I effort.  More specifically, he felt that 
political leaders would not be willing to receive ideas concerning religion until a later 
point in an already ongoing peace-process.  “[We are] going through phases,” he said, 
“and we are still in the political part.  It is phase one.  We have not yet gotten to the 
religious part.”103  For the Sheikh, the political situation must first be dealt with before 
the ideas concerning religion will be received.  Dr. Kronish articulated a similar 
sentiment, noting that the current political situation hinders the possibility for 
initiatives to make a large impact:   
 
There is only so much you can do when the war is waging.  When the war is over, you 
can do more.  We can’t do anything with Bethlehem, Jenin, or Gaza until the war ends, 
for example.  We can only do little bits.  We can build relationships.  We can keep 
hope alive.104 
 
This view, once again, reiterates the perception that many religious leaders feel 
subordinate to the larger political issues, but also indicates that some religious leaders 
feel that their work may have little impact in the current political context.   
 
For Patriarch Sabah, the current political context can be compared to what he refers to 
as an “open wound.”  Politicians and grassroots populations will not consider certain 
issues, such as agreements on holy sites, until the political context has shifted.  When 
reflecting on some of the obstacles of interreligious track-II diplomacy, he described 
the current political context in this way:   
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There are sensitive issues here.  It is like a wound.  You cannot heal it.  You cannot 
touch it.  You need to wait until the inflammation goes down.  You need to wait until 
the trust is born between Jews and Palestinians.  Until they trust each other and are 
friendly with each other.105   
 
In other words, he believes the impact of interreligious track-II initiatives may be 
better suited for a point when the parties trust each other more. 
Other respondents also perceived the impact of their work as something that will not 
be fully effective until a later time, but instead emphasized the necessity to begin the 
work now to lay the groundwork for the future.  Rabbi Rosen, for instance, discussed 
the impact of interreligious efforts in the region, expressing that the work will mainly 
have an impact “the morning after.”106 At the same time, however, there is a 
responsibility to begin the work now.  Dr. Kronish also indicated that the real process 
of working together will begin after a peace agreement has been reached.  Yet, if 
religious leaders wait to begin their work until the ‘morning after,’ they will ask 
themselves “why did we wait?  We have wasted so many years!”107 
 
One religious leader, however, emphasized the value of interreligious track-II 
diplomacy, but emphasized that another process should possibly occur first in order for 
the results to be more effective.  For Father Khader, a key prerequisite for 
interreligious work is an intra-religious process.  In order for interreligious initiatives 
to have the greatest impact in conflict resolution, religious groups must address the 
differences and challenges within their own faith traditions.  As he put it: 
 
We need internal conversations in order to promote just peace in the Middle East.  
There are a lot of religious leaders with good will, but the voices of fundamentalists 
are much higher.  That’s why we need to have a Jewish-Jewish dialogue.  A Muslim-
Muslim dialogue.  A Christian-Christian one.  It is not enough for Muslims to say “al-
Qaeda does not represent Islam.  I have to clean my backyard first to reach a basic 
understanding of what is diversity, acceptance of the other, and the otherness of the 
other.108 
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By first addressing internal inconsistencies and conflicts, each religious group can be 
better equipped to address big issues facing each other.  They also can be ready to 
address the fundamentalists within each of their own religious circles. 
 
5.5.2 How Long Until Success? 
 
A second facet of the question of timing concerns the amount of time necessary to 
“succeed” in the efforts.  Here, the data suggests an apparent point of tension related to 
the initiatives’ previously discussed goals.  As noted in section 4.4.4, Palestinian 
Muslims most frequently viewed the goal of interreligious track-II efforts as altering 
the immediate political conditions in the region.  Consequently, emphasis was placed 
on particular needs being fulfilled hastily rather than over a long period of time.  The 
impact and “success” of the effort should lead to changes in the near future.  Several 
Palestinian Muslims were left feeling dissatisfied and frustrated when such changes 
did not occur, resulting in one Muslim respondent quitting interreligious efforts 
entirely.  
 
While some Palestinian Christians and Israeli Jews also shared the view that 
interreligious track-II efforts should aim to alter certain political conditions currently 
occurring, they more frequently discussed their work as one that aims for long-term 
impact rather than immediate impact.  Rabbi Weiman-Keller, for example, expressed 
doubt that work being conducted today will have immediate political impact.  It will 
instead take a considerable amount of time to see noticeable results.  “At this point, we 
are going to need a lot of inter-faith and co-existence work to see results, and I am in it 
for the long haul.  Not for any immediate political rewards, because that it not going to 
happen.”109  Patriarch Sabah also expressed a view that a considerable amount of time 
will be needed to make large impacts.  When discussing the idea of the conflict 
currently being an open wound, he noted that this wound may take a long time to heal:  
“[Palestinians and Israelis] will become more generous and objective to each other, but 
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this needs time.  After 50, 60 years of peace, time will allow us to speak very 
concretely and generously to each other about the sensitive issues.”110 
 
For Mr. Wiener, history shows that interreligious initiatives take a considerable 
amount of time to address the very controversial topics.  When reflecting on the 
history of Jewish-Christian outside of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he articulated 
that the impact of interreligious initiatives might not be seen until well into the future: 
 
As I told someone earlier, the Catholic Church and Protestants conducted dialogue for 
700 years.  Only lately have they started discussing the controversial differences.  
After two or three meetings with a group Catholics [that I was involved in], someone 
who wasn’t involved asked me why would not talk about the truly controversial things 
of the relationship.  I told them, ‘Well, it has only been three years now.  Come back 
to me in 697 years, and we will talk more about it.’111 
 
It is therefore necessary to continue working toward a cause although it may take a 
considerable amount of time to reach agreement on the issues that divide the most. 
 
5.5.3 Implications 
 
The variance in perceptions concerning the importance of timing of interreligious 
track-II efforts is an issue that is still hotly debated by track-II diplomacy scholars.  
Jones (2008a, 6), for instance, discusses the tension that has emerged over determining 
whether there is an “ideal” moment for instigating non-official efforts or not, or how 
long the efforts should ultimately take.  Citing Zartman (2000), Crocker et al. (2003), 
and Bartoli (2003), Jones argues that disagreement over if a “ripe” moment for the 
initiatives exists is still a prominent point of divergence within the field. While 
respondents to this study may not have offered enough evidence to support deep 
conclusions related to the timing of the initiatives, the diversity in responses indicates 
that interreligious track-II efforts suffer many of the same challenges facing more 
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traditional forms of track-II diplomacy.  It also suggests that different unfulfilled 
expectations related to timing might affect participant’s experiences, and ultimately 
the viability, of interreligious track-II efforts.   
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6. Conclusions 
 
This study has sought to contribute to the academic discourse related to track-II 
diplomacy as well as religion and peacebuilding. The concluding chapter therefore will 
revisit the findings and conclusion of the aforementioned research objectives explored 
in this thesis, namely: 
1.) to analyze the extent that current interreligious initiatives between Israelis and 
Palestinians can be characterized as track-II diplomacy.  
 
2.) to identify what Israeli and Palestinian religious leaders view as key 
possibilities, as well as major obstacles, toward a viable interreligious track-II 
channel between Israelis and Palestinians.  
 
6.1 Findings and Conclusions of Research Objective #1 
 
Conclusion #1:  The assertion that all models of interreligious initiatives can be 
characterized as track-II diplomacy, specifically in the Palestinian-Israeli context, is 
inaccurate.  A majority of the initiatives might better be characterized as “people-to-
people diplomacy” or “citizens diplomacy.” 
 
Interreligious track-II diplomacy is built upon the same assumptions and goals asserted 
in more traditional track-II initiatives, specifically in that: 
 
a.) the efforts must be based on the fundamental belief that interactions between 
adversarial groups in an unofficial setting will help improve relations between the two 
parties, and; 
 
b.) the initiatives are built on the assumption that “the improved relations and jointly 
formulated ideas are transferred and incorporated into the society and/or official 
policymaking processes” (Cuhadar 2009, 641). 
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Using theoretical literature on the goals and assumptions of track-II diplomacy, I 
therefore argue that interreligious track-II diplomacy can be identified as unofficial 
dialogue of religious elites, focused on problem solving, with attention to both 
spiritual exchanges and the overall political relationship of the parties.  This 
definition emphasizes religious leaders being in the best position to transfer jointly 
achieved ideas to both the vertical (formal policymaking processes) and horizontal 
(grassroots laypersons) levels of the conflict.  It also places emphasis on the necessity 
for initiatives to address political challenges facing the parties rather than avoiding 
them entirely, as is frequently done in interreligious settings between Israelis and 
Palestinians.   
 
When looking to research conducted by Abu-Nimer et al. (2007) and Landou (2003) 
on current interreligious initiatives taking place between Israelis and Palestinians, it is 
evident that a majority of the interreligious initiatives currently occurring between 
Israelis and Palestinians cannot be characterized as track-II diplomacy after all.  This 
shortcoming essentially stems from two reasons.  First, a majority of the initiatives 
between Israelis and Palestinians are what can be considered “cognitive” or “doctrinal 
scientific.”  Initiatives deliberately exclude political conversations related to the 
conflict in order to focus on issues of spirituality, religious texts, and rituals.  While 
such activities aim to alter mischaracterizations about the religious traditions, it 
purposely avoids the overall political relationship of the parties.  In other words, such 
activities may be better described as “people-to-people diplomacy,” a concept 
developed further by Saunders (1991, 50).   
 
Secondly, both Abu-Nimer et al. (2007) and Landau (2003) highlighted a number of 
initiatives that utilized laypersons as the primary participants.  This was the case for a 
majority of the activities characterized as grassroots peacebuilding, symbolic ritual, 
and from personal grief to collective compassion.  Although the intent of many of the 
initiatives was to influence support for peace across the grassroots layer of the conflict, 
such participants may not be in the position to influence change on the vertical level of 
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the conflict.  Scholars such as Saunders (1991) would generally instead describe such 
activities as “citizens’ diplomacy” rather than track-II diplomacy as focus is placed on 
the role of average citizens in diplomacy.   
 
Conclusion #2: Although interreligious track-II diplomacy utilizes participants not 
traditionally involved in track-II efforts, initiatives between Israelis and Palestinians 
generally share the same goals as other more traditional forms of track-II diplomacy.  
An exception may be related to the prominent view that their meeting can prevent a 
“spark” between populations. 
 
Respondents to this study articulated four general themes related to the goals of 
“interreligious track-II diplomacy.” Interreligious track-II initiatives aimed to a.) 
humanize the other and bridge differences between the Israeli and Palestinian 
populations, b.)  alter the common misperception that religious actors do not believe in 
peace, c.) halt a “spark” between populations that could further deteriorate the conflict, 
and/or d.) instigate immediate changes to the political context between parties.  
Although responses within each of these themes were far from uniform, they do 
suggest that Palestinian-Israeli interreligious track-II efforts, by and large, strive to 
achieve similar outcomes as more traditional track-II efforts.  One point of variation 
was the prominent assertion that interreligious track-II diplomacy can prevent potential 
“sparks” between grassroots actors.  While this is not necessarily inconsistent with 
other track-II efforts, the findings suggest that Palestinian and Israeli religious leaders 
perceive themselves as having a unique ability to influence their constituencies on a 
grassroots level.   
  
6.2 Findings and Conclusions of Research Objective #2 
 
Conclusion #1: Palestinian-Israeli interreligious track-II initiatives may have a 
stronger chance of viability within the horizontal level of the conflict as religious 
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leaders perceive themselves as having greater influence on grassroots constituencies 
than political authorities.   
 
While track-II diplomacy is built on the assumption that realizations, strategies, and 
options developed in informal setting will transfer back to more formal processes, 
scholars are left with the challenge of identifying concrete indicators of success.  
Hence, this thesis aimed to identify the perceived possibilities and barriers for the 
viability of the initiatives rather than testing if new ideas can be transferred. When 
looking to the religious leaders themselves, several themes emerged.  First, Muslim, 
Christian, and Jewish leaders overwhelming viewed their role in peacebuilding as one 
better fit to influence grassroots levels of the conflict than formal political channels.  
Using language such as “enormous power” and “big credibility” to describe their 
position within grassroots movements, while paradoxically stating that their work does 
not permeate political systems and is “overwhelmingly subordinate” to formal political 
channels, religious leaders articulated a perception of doubt that their ideas will be 
transferred vertically.  This could have a number of implications, such as religious 
leaders avoiding certain topics or neglecting pass ideas vertically.  Yet, it also may 
serve as a key opportunity for religious leaders to transfer ideas horizontally due to a 
perception of unique influence. 
 
Conclusion #2:  While the coupling of religion and politics in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict may be adversely contributing to the viability of interreligious track-II 
initiatives, interreligious track-II diplomacy may paradoxically be in the ideal position 
to untangle many religiously sensitive issues in the conflict that have been coupled 
with politics. 
 
Respondents to this study overwhelmingly perceived that the range of topics for 
discussion during interreligious track-II diplomacy either a.) was already restricted to 
certain topics, or b.) should be restricted to certain topics.  While respondents were not 
unanimous on what topics should or should not covered in discussion, the findings 
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suggest that Israeli and Palestinian interreligious track-II participants may come to the 
table with different interpretations of what is “religious” what is “political.”  It 
additionally suggests that participants of interreligious track-II diplomacy have 
different interpretations of the boundary to which religious leaders should discuss 
topics that are not solely related to spiritually.  This issue presents what could be 
considered a catch-22 for interreligious track-II diplomacy between Israelis and 
Palestinians.  Without untangling the nuances between what is “political” and what is 
“religious,” the informal dialogues might serve as additional venue for the denial or 
suppression of fundamental human needs such as acceptance or validation.  It may 
make it difficult to take on more “hard” track-II efforts as some religious leaders might 
perceive it since these goals as unreachable.  At the same time, however, interreligious 
track-II diplomacy may be in the prime position to untangle the coupling of religion 
and politics in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, an issue that continues to exacerbate the 
conflict.   
 
Conclusion #3: Similar to other forms of track-II diplomacy, interreligious track-II 
initiatives between Israelis and Palestinians struggle to find the “ideal” participants – 
those who are open to new ideas while having proper influence on both the vertical 
and horizontal levels of the conflict.   
 
Many religious leaders voiced concern with finding the “right participants” who are 
willing to meet, but also have influence on the vertical and horizontal levels of the 
conflict.  According to respondents, interreligious track-II initiatives between Israelis 
and Palestinians generally have included participants who already believed in the 
benefit of the meeting or are employed to be there.  Religious leaders representing 
significant portions of both populations rarely, if ever, participate, which is often 
perceived as a limitation for the viability and impact of the initiatives.  This challenge 
represents an overall limitation to track-II diplomacy, not exclusively interreligious 
track-II diplomacy, often cited by scholars. 
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Conclusion #4: While the inclusion of heads of religious institutions to Palestinian-
Israeli interreligious track-II diplomacy may provide a greater chance for viability 
within vertical levels, it may result in a process characterized by track-I-like features 
that are contrary to the logic of track-II diplomacy.  Such initiatives may resemble 
“track one-and-a-half” diplomacy rather than track-II diplomacy. 
 
While the heads of religious institutions in Israel and the occupied Palestinian 
territories may be in the best position to transfer new ideas to their respective 
governments, their inclusion may contribute to the initiative taking on many of the 
structural constraints present in formal, track-I processes.  Muslim, Christian, and 
Jewish respondents to this study believe this is the case for two primary reasons:  1.) a 
perceived lack of freedom from the institution itself, and 2.) a perceived lack of 
distance from the official government structures.  Respondents felt that heads of 
religious institutions may be unable to speak on behalf of their own opinions since 
they must consistently check with their constituencies to keep their position in the 
religious hierarchy. Additionally, since many of the positions are government 
appointed and funded, several respondents perceived that they take on an almost 
“diplomatic” role as they represent the formal government structures.  These 
characteristics are contrary to the logic of track-II diplomacy as an informal 
supplement to formal channels, and might better be characterized as another form of 
peacebuilding known as “track-one-and-a-half” due to the inclusion of government 
employees. 
 
6.3 Reflections and Recommendations 
 
This thesis was initially conceptualized around the potential linkage between 
Palestinian-Israeli interreligious track-II initiatives with a formal track-I peace process.  
Given the lack of theoretical literature and the operational challenges of measuring 
impact on a peace process, the focus shifted to the question of the initiatives’ viability 
as a whole.  Further research should focus on a case-specific interreligious track-II 
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initiative between Muslim, Christian, and Jewish participants to further explore the 
theoretical and empirical barriers and opportunities for linkage with formal processes.  
This would also be an opportunity to engage the question of “timing” related to 
initiatives (see section 5.5). 
 
An additional area of further research would be related to the coupling of religion and 
politics in the Palestinian-Israeli context, specifically to explore the extent to which 
religious leaders actually can or cannot contribute to a final status peace agreement.  
As articulated by a number of respondents as well as the scholarly literature, some of 
the most religiously sensitive issues in the conflict (i.e. holy sites, the future of 
Jerusalem, the status of the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount) are linked with some of 
the most thorny legal and bureaucratic issues (legal jurisdiction, access, archeological 
protection, property rights, tax laws, and minority rights).  A nuanced analysis of 
religious leaders’ potential contributions to a peace agreement is necessary. 
 
Finally, further research ought to be carried out on the participation of parties currently 
absent from a majority of interreligious track-II efforts. While such research may be 
admittedly speculative, a discussion on the potential impact that “spoilers” may play 
on a future interreligious track-II driven agreement would be a valuable addition to the 
discourse on the field.   
 
Throughout the long history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, scholars and 
practitioners alike have recognized the potential value of track-II diplomacy toward 
managing, and eventually resolving, the conflict.  This study has shown that the 
participation of religious actors can indeed be recognized as an underutilized subset of 
track-II diplomacy.  Interreligious track-II efforts strive to fulfill many of the same 
objectives as more traditional track-II efforts, and they address many religiously 
charged issues that continue to exacerbate the conflict’s intractability. At the same 
time, however, interreligious track-II diplomacy faces the same challenges and 
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limitations as other more traditional forms of track-II diplomacy.  Interreligious track-
II diplomacy should not be misunderstood as a be-all-end-all-fix. 
 
Ultimately, this thesis does not imply that religious actors are the missing piece toward 
breaking the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate, nor that all religious leaders are willing to 
be peacemakers.  What it does suggest, however, is that religious actors in Israel and 
the occupied Palestinian territories do have the potential to make a contribution toward 
peace.  While this may not entail a signed peace agreement as a direct result of 
interreligious track-II efforts, their ability to think creatively together demonstrates the 
will and desire of the populations to live together in a just peace for all.  As one 
religious leader concluded his interview, “We don’t do this work because we are going 
to succeed.  We do it because it’s the right thing to do.”112 
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Appendix B: Semi-Structured Interview 
Guide 
 
1.) Can you tell me a little about yourself and how you became involved in 
interreligious work?  
 
2.) Please tell me a little about the types of interreligious efforts have you been / 
are involved in? 
 
3.) How would you respond to the claim that this conflict is a religious conflict? 
 
4.) What are the assumptions, goals, or foundations of your work? / What would 
like to accomplish in these efforts? 
 
5.) What are the major obstacles that you face in your interreligious work?  / What 
are the biggest obstacles within your own religious group?  / What are the 
biggest obstacles with other religious groups? 
 
6.) What needs of the Palestinian/Israeli people, if any, do religious leaders bring 
forward to interreligious efforts? 
 
7.) Can you tell me a bit about what types of participants are involved in these 
efforts? 
 
8.) When, if ever, is it appropriate to talk about politics in interreligious efforts? 
 
9.) How would your (respective) governments respond to new ideas generated in 
interreligious efforts? 
 
10.) How do other leaders/ members of your religion respond to your interreligious 
efforts? 
 
